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The Majority That Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and
the Mischief of Quorum Requirements
Jonathan Remy Nash†
In this Paper, I consider the question of precedential value in settings in
which a case is decided by a majority of judges hearing a case but less
than a majority of judges authorized to decide the case—a situation I refer
to as a “minority majority.” In analyzing the question of treatment of
minority majorities, the Paper makes three broad contributions to the
literature. First, it disaggregates the requirements that undergird the
notion that a Court opinion receive precedential effect into three
categories: quorum requirements, action requirements, and voting rule
requirements. The Paper’s second broad contribution is its normative
analysis of the precedent question. The Paper identifies two categories of
plausible responses to the problem. First, one might increase the
stringency of the requirements that fall under the first two categories—
that is, quorum and action requirements in order to minimize possible
minority majority cases. Second, one might address the problem by
varying the precedential effect of cases decided by minority majorities.
Specifically, one might accord them “full” precedential effect, no
precedential effect, narrow precedential effect, or limited precedential
effect. The Paper argues that affording narrow and limited precedential
effect may be desirable, and that affording no precedential effect on the
court that issued the decision is an underexamined option. The third
contribution that the Paper makes is to use the discussion of the normative
question to shed light on broader issues. These include the legitimacy of
courts, the relationship between legitimacy and stare decisis; the proper
breadth of court opinions and holdings; and questions of institutional
choice as to who should decide how these questions are resolved; and the
importance of judicial minimalism.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following situation: Two of nine Justices do not hear or vote upon
the disposition of a case pending before the United States Supreme Court (because of
illness, recusal, or vacancies on the Court). In accordance with governing statute, the
case is decided by a properly constituted quorum of seven Justices,1 with four Justices
constituting a majority. How much precedential value should accrue to the Court’s
decision?
Courts have differed in their answers to these questions. Consider the views of a
state supreme court, and subsequently the Supreme Court itself, in respect of the Supreme
Court’s 1972 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin.2 There the Court held unconstitutional
Florida and Pennsylvania statutes that authorized repossession by creditors of sold goods
without judicial order, approval, or participation. The case was decided with only seven
Justices participating.3 The majority opinion attracted a mere four Justices; three Justices
dissented.4
Later that year, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to follow Fuentes.5 The
majority explained that it was “reluctant to declare unconstitutional Arizona statutes
based upon a decision by less than a clear majority.”6
1

28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the
United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”).
2
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3
Justices Powell and Rehnquist had yet to take their seats when the Fuentes case was argued, and
neither participated in the consideration or resolution of the case. Id. at 97; Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600, 635 n.8 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
4
The majority opinion was authored by Justice Stewart, and joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall. Justice White’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. See Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 97 (White, J., dissenting).
5
See Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Ariz. 1972).
6
Id. at 1330. More broadly, the state supreme court majority explained:
The petitioner . . . asserts that because two justices did not participate in this opinion the four man
opinion is clearly not a majority opinion, is advisory only, and therefore not binding upon this court.
Admittedly, were we convinced that the four man majority of the Untied States Supreme Court in
Fuentes . . . would become at least a five man majority when the two judges who did not participate in
the particular case are called up to participate in a similar question, we would then be inclined to follow
the decision as set down in Fuentes . . . . When, however, we have doubts that once the full court hears
the case that the opinion will stand, we are reluctant to declare unconstitutional Arizona statutes based
upon a decision by less than a clear majority.
Id. at 1329-30. The court proceeded to uphold the state statute at issue, despite Fuentes, explaining: “We
do not believe . . . that it is unreasonable to ask that before we are required to declare unconstitutional
statutes enacted by our legislature with the resulting chaos to an important part of our commercial and
contract law, that the United States Supreme Court speak with at least a majority voice on the subject.” Id.
at 1331. See also Roofing Wholesale Co., 502 P.2d at 1331 (Hays, Ch. J., concurring) (“In this case, we
really ask for a clearer command [from the United States Supreme Court] before we declare an established
law of our state unconstitutional and disrupt the business and legal practices of our community.”).
Compare also State ex rel. Williams v. Berry, 492 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Mo. 1973) (Seiler, J., concurring in
result) (“In my opinion, we are bound by Fuentes v. Shevin. Its force as a final and binding decision of the
Supreme Court is not lessened by its being handed down by seven justices instead of nine.”), with id. at 737
(Henley, J., dissenting) (“The principal opinion relies in part upon Fuentes, thus indicating that that case is
binding on this court. I am not satisfied that we are bound by it. Fuentes was decided by seven of the nine
3
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In 1974, two years after Fuentes, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co.7 again considered the constitutionality of a state statute that authorized repossession
by creditors of sold property.
This time, five Justices voted to uphold the
constitutionality of the Louisiana statute at issue; four Justices dissented.8
The Court in Mitchell did not suggest that the fact that the Fuentes majority was
joined by only four Justices rendered it either a nullity for stare decisis purposes, or even
less of a precedent. Rather, the Court distinguished Fuentes factually and legally, relying
substantially on the fact that the Louisiana statute called for greater judicial involvement
than had the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes invalidated in Fuentes.9
The approach taken by the Court in Mitchell—that a decision rendered by a fourJustice majority is no different on that ground from any other majority decision—was not
always the approach used by the Court. In 1870’s Legal Tender Cases,10 the Court
judges of th[e Supreme] [C]ourt, with only four, less than a majority of all judges constituting that court,
joining in the decision, and three dissenting therefrom. . . . The Supreme Court of Arizona recently
declined to follow Fuentes . . . . I agree fully with what was said by the Supreme Court of Arizona and the
concurring opinion of its Chief Justice.”).
7
416 U.S. 600.
8
Justice White, who had written the dissent in Fuentes, wrote the majority opinion in Mitchell; Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined the majority opinion. Justices
Stewart, who had written the majority opinion in Fuentes, dissented. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined
Justice Stewart’s dissent. Justice Brennan wrote simply that the Court’s opinion in Fuentes “requires
reversal of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana,” which had upheld the state statute against
constitutional challenge. Id. at 636.
9
See id. at 615-18.
Justice Powell, concurring, concluded that Mitchell in fact overruled Fuentes. Id. at 623 (Powell, J.,
concurring). He did not, however, suggest that Fuentes was more susceptible to overruling because the
majority there numbered only four. Rather, he stated that “[n]arrower grounds existed for invalidating the
replevin statutes” in Fuentes, id. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring), and proceeded to elucidate differences
between the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes in Fuentes and the Louisiana statute in Mitchell, see id. at
625-27 (Powell, J., concurring).
One might discover beneath the surface some suggestions on the part of the majority that Fuentes was
not entitled to “full” stare decisis effect. For example, the Mitchell majority noted that earlier cases
approving prejudgment attachment without notice, hearing, or judicial order had been approved by the
Court “unanimously,” id. at 613, and that a state supreme court case to that effect had been affirmed by the
Court “without opinion,” id. at 614. If they are relevant at all, however, these emphases by the majority in
Mitchell tend to suggest that, if Fuentes was entitled to less precedential effect than usual, it was not
because it attracted only four majority votes, but rather because earlier precedent to the contrary was well
settled and widely supported, while the recent precedent (including, presumably, cases other than Fuentes)
had been decided by more closely divided votes.
It is only Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion, written on behalf of himself and two of the other three
dissenting Justices, that suggests otherwise. Like Justice Powell, Justice Stewart asserted that the majority
had overruled Fuentes. See id. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Finding no jurisprudential justification for
overruling the two-year old decision, Justice Stewart commented that “[t]he only perceivable change that
has occurred since Fuentes is in the makeup of this Court.” Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see id. at 635 n.8
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Although Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist were Members of the
Court at the time that Fuentes v. Shevin was announced, they were not Members of the Court when that
case was argued, and they did not participate in its ‘consideration or decision.’”).
10
79 U.S. 457 (1870)
4
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declined to follow its earlier decision in Hepburn v. Griswold11—decided only the
previous Term—at least in part on the ground that it had been “decided by a divided
court, and by a court having a less number of judges than the law then in existence
provided this court shall have.”12 Earlier still in the eighteenth century, the Court avoided
the issue by refusing to decide cases on constitutional matters when less than a majority
of the whole Court would concur in a dispositive opinion.13 And, several years after
Mitchell, Justice Stevens concurred in a majority opinion that distinguished an earlier 4-3
decision by the Court, explaining that, “[b]ecause only four Justices . . . joined the
[earlier] opinion, I do not believe it should be read as having made a substantial change in
settled law.”14
In this Paper, I consider the question of precedential value in settings, such as
these, where a case is decided by a majority of judges hearing a case but less than a
majority of judges authorized to decide the case15—a situation I refer to as a “minority
majority.” That minority majorities may in fact occur under relatively limited
circumstances16 hardly renders the question of how to deal with them unworthy of
examination. For one thing, multiple health-related absences and vacancies on courts17
may take place in fits and spurts.18 Especially given the low number of cases on the
Supreme Court’s docket19 and the difficulty in predicting which cases may loom large in
11

75 U.S. 603 (1869).
79 U.S. 457, 553-54 (1870).
13
See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
14
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 568 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); see infra text
accompanying note 142.
15
In the case where the court sits en banc (as opposed to in panels composed of fewer than all the
judges on the court), this reduces simply to the situation where the cases is decided by a majority of judges
sitting, but less than a majority of seats on the court.
16
The problem may arise only in cases in not all the judges authorized to sit on the court are called upon
to render a decision and, on most courts, will involve a “deficiency” of at least two judges. In this sense,
the problem may arise only in limited circumstances.
17
In contrast, recusals may consistently be relatively uncommon (especially so of two judges)—perhaps
precisely because judges are aware of the risks to the judicial institution that may result from recusal. See,
e.g., Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 84-94 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices are loathe to recuse
themselves because of the risk that the remaining eight Justices will split evenly on outcome, and showing
that recusal rates have declined over time); cf. Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices:
The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 661-65 (1996) (arguing that the disqualification of a
single Justice significantly decreases the chance that four votes can be had to grant certiorari). Thus,
Professors Black and Epstein conclude not that equally divided Court determinations are unproblematic,
but rather than the problem is cabined because recusals are relatively infrequent. See Black & Epstein,
supra, at 87-93. See also Cheney v. United States District Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
mem.) (declining to recuse himself, in part because of the risk that his recusal could result in an equally
divided Court).
18
See Roofing Wholesale Co., 502 P.2d at 1332 (Struckmeyer, J., dissenting) (“During the same term,
October 1971, that Fuentes v. Shevin, . . . was handed down, eleven other opinions of the United States
Supreme Court were decided by a four-member majority.”).
19
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking Docket, 43 TRIAL 64, 64 (2007) (“Last year,
the Supreme Court issued only 69 decisions with signed opinions—the smallest number it has produced
since before the Civil War. This year, the Court will decide even fewer cases. . . . In the 1980s, the Court
was regularly deciding 150 cases a year. During its 1991 October term, the Court issued 117 signed
opinions. Now it’s deciding half that number.”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking
12

5
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future as precedent,20 the question raised by the precedential value of decisions decided
by a minority majority is larger than the statistical frequency with which such cases
occur. Moreover, commentators have recently noted that increases in the risk of terrorrelated attacks may render the government in general21—and courts in particular22—with
fewer personnel than normal for extended periods of time. Beyond this, the issues of
what constitutes a court, and what representation of court membership is necessary to
bind later panels of the court, and lower courts, go directly to fundamental questions of
judicial legitimacy itself.
In analyzing the question of treatment of minority majorities, the Paper makes
three broad contributions to the literature. First, the Paper disaggregates the requirements
that undergird the notion that a Court opinion receive precedential effect. The first
category of requirements consists of quorum requirements. A quorum requirement
answers the question of how many judges on a court must there be for the court,
officially, to take any action at all? The second category consists of prerequisites for the
Court to take certain actions—to which I shall refer as “action requirements.” An
example is the requirement, discussed above and applied by the Supreme Court in the
early eighteenth century, that at least a majority of the whole Court concur in a decision
on a constitutional matter before an opinion could issue. A modern example is the “ruleof-four” that the Court employs to decide whether to grant certiorari petitions. The last
two categories of requirements consists of rules governing when, and to what extent, a
court opinion counts as the opinion of the court, and is entitled to precedential effect.
These requirements generally reduce to simple “majority rule,” although with some
important wrinkles, as we shall see below.
The Paper’s second broad contribution is its normative analysis of the precedent
question. The Paper identifies two categories of plausible responses to the problem.
Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s
docket has shrunk from 146 signed opinions during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s first year occupying the
Court's center seat to just 74 signed opinions during his final year.”).
20
Among the cases decided by a 4-3 vote during the same 1971 Term as Fuentes (with Justices Powell
and Rehnquist again not participating) was Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), a major case on the
question of federal court standing. See Roofing Wholesale Co., 502 P.2d at 1332 (Struckmeyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, “[i]n 1920, the leading case of United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417, . . . was decided by a four-member majority”); see also Paul Carrington, The Problem of Minority
Decisions, 44 A.B.A. J. 137, 137 (1958) (identifying 19 cases “from the last eight terms of the Supreme
Court . . . [in which] decisions were reached with opinions rendered, . . . in which less than nine Justices
participated and those Justices who did participate were evenly or almost evenly divided,” and noting that
“[t]hese nineteen cases involved many highly important precedent-creating issues”).
21
See, e.g., John Bryan Williams, How to Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s Majority
Quorum Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025 (2006); Paul Taylor,
Proposals to Prevent Discontinuity in Government and Preserve the Right to Elected Representation, 54
SYRACUSE L. REV. 435, 447-55 (2004); Symposium on Ensuring the Continuity of Government in Times of
Crisis, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 943 (2004).
22
See Randolph Moss & Edward Siskel, The Least Vulnerable Branch: Ensuring the Continuity of the
Supreme Court, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1019-28 (2004) (arguing that, while numerous vacancies on the
Court alone might be tolerable for some period of time, the risk that a terror attack might debilitate as well
the Senate, the Executive branch, or both is very real, and might leave the country without a functioning
Court for an extended period).
6
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First, one might increase the stringency of the requirements that fall under the first two
categories—that is, quorum and action requirements in order to minimize possible
minority majority cases.
A second, more workable option is to address the problem by varying the
precedential effect of cases decided by minority majorities. Specifically, one might
accord them “full” precedential effect, no precedential effect, narrow precedential effect,
or limited precedential effect. Here, the Paper argues that minority majority decisions be
given narrow, limited precedential weight. It also argues that the notion of having a court
give its own earlier minority majority decisions no weight is undervalued and
underexplored.
The third contribution that the Paper makes is to use the discussion of the
normative question on broader issues. These include the legitimacy of courts, the
relationship between legitimacy and stare decisis; the proper breadth of court opinions
and holdings; and questions of institutional choice as to who should decide how these
questions are resolved; and the importance of judicial minimalism.
Part II of the Paper elucidates the four categories of requirements that underlie the
ultimate question of whether, and to what extent, a court’s decision is entitled to
precedential effect. Part III turns to the setting of minority majorities. It explains why
minority majority decisions may be problematic and describes various responses to the
problem. It then provides a normative analysis of how best to deal with minority
majority decisions. It concludes with a discussion of institutional choice in the setting of
minority majority decisions.
II.

MAJORITY RULE, QUORUM REQUIREMENTS, AND THEIR INTERPLAY

In this Part, I unpack the process by which a court generates precedent. In
Section A, I consider the threshold requirements that must be cleared before a court may
decide a case and issue an opinion. In Section B, I turn to the question of the applicable
voting rule, deciding cases, and the precedential effects of those decisions.

7
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A. Threshold Requirements to Issuing a Decision
To understand exactly how courts operate and create precedent, it is helpful to
identify two threshold questions:
(1) What is the minimum requirement for the court to transact business?
(2) What is the minimum requirement for the court to “act,” e.g., to issue a decision?
The answers to these questions vary with court system, and often over time even
within a court system.23 Additionally, these answers are sometimes found in
constitutions, sometimes in statutes, and sometimes are not written but are derived from
the common law or otherwise judicially created. That said, it is possible to summarize
the general categories of requirements that respond to each question.
Essentially, quorum requirements set the minimum threshold for a court to
transact business. The quorum is the minimal number of judges required for the court
legally to “transact business.”
Many court systems impose no additional requirement beyond the quorum for
courts to issue decisions. Some, however, impose a requirement that a minimum number
of judges concur in a decision, and some impose such a requirement for decisions that fall
into a particular subject matter. I refer to such requirements as “action requirements.”
I explore each of these questions, and responses, in turn in the following
Subsections.
1. Quorum requirements
The size of courts—and the number of judges who are to sit as panels of the
court—is set by constitution, statute,24 or some combination thereof. As a general matter,
all the judges of a court will hear a case.25 It may happen, however, that a judge’s health
or other personal situation precludes a judge from hearing a case. Alternatively, judges
may recuse themselves from hearing and deciding cases. And political machinations may
produce prolonged court vacancies. This raises the question of the minimum number of
23

For example, Table 1, infra, sets out the quorum requirements that Congress has established for the
Supreme Court over time. But cf. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1155 (2006) (“The constitutional and statutory rules governing the Court—the
number of its members, their terms of tenure, the voting and quorum rules that govern their actions, and so
on—have in most cases remained unchanged, at least since Reconstruction, and in some cases since the
first Judiciary Act of 1789.”).
24
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (setting the current size of the United States Supreme Court at nine: one
Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices).
25
Some courts may sit in panels, in which case the number of judges who sit on the panel is set. E.g.,
id. § 46(b).
8
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judges who may transact business—e.g., to hear cases or to decide which cases to hear—
for the court.
Absent some sort of minimal quorum requirement, it would seem that a single
judge conceivably could render judgment for an entire court.26 Quorum requirements,
however, set a lower limit for the number of judges out of which a majority may be
drawn. Put succinctly, the quorum requirement sets the minimum number of judges who
are empowered to sit as a court and, among other things, resolve cases.
Quorum requirements are commonplace for governing bodies, from corporations’
boards of directors to legislative bodies.27 “A group of members of a corporate board or
a legislature smaller than the required quorum has no power to act for the corporate
entity. The moment its number reaches the quorum level, however, the group has the
power to make decisions and take actions that are binding on the entire body.”28
26

Because of the quorum requirement, a single Justice cannot issue an opinion for the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Locks v. Commanding General, Sixth Army, 89 S. Ct. 31, 32 (1968) (Douglas,
Circuit Justice) (“[A]part from granting stays, arranging bail, and providing for other ancillary relief, an
individual Justice of this Court has no power to dispose of cases on the merits.”). Consider, however, the
action taken by Justice Powell, as Circuit Justice, in Barnstone v. University of Houston, 446 U.S. 318
(1980) (Powell, Circuit Justice). There an applicant sought relief from an order of the Fifth Circuit
vacating the district court’s temporary restraining order. Justice Powell explained:
Although applicant requests that the Court grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, in purpose and effect applicant is requesting that the order of that court be vacated,
thereby reinstating the temporary restraining order of the District Court. Such a request normally
comes to me as Circuit Justice. Although I may have considered referring this to the entire Court,
a quorum is not present. I therefore exercise my authority as Circuit Justice to rule on applicant’s
application.
Upon consideration of the papers, I deny the application.
I have consulted informally with each of my Brethren who was present at the Court when these
papers arrived late this afternoon. Although no other Justice has participated in the drafting of this
order, I am authorized to state that each of the three whom I consulted would vote to deny this
application. Of course, this action should not be taken as expressing a view on the merits of the
questions raised in this case.
Id. at 1318-19.
See also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 190 P. 513, 520 (Colo. 1920) (Scott, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for citing Commonwealth v. Mathues, 59 A. 961 (Pa. 1904), in which a lone judge
out of a high court of seven “assumed to and did pronounce the decision of the court[,] . . . cit[ing] no
authority for his unprecedented and arbitrary act [and] . . . not even refer[ring] to the Constitution or
statutes of his state, from which he must have derived his authority if he had any”); Michael J. Mazza, A
New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131, 157 (2002-03)
(“To address th[e] problem [of the same district judge who presided over a trial also convening the
appellate court and resolving the appeal], the 1869 Act provided that any two of the sitting judges--whether
that pair included a Supreme Court justice, circuit judge, or district judge--constituted a quorum.”).
27
See Williams, supra note 21, at 1032 (“The purpose of a quorum requirement in any corporate body,
from a board of directors to a state or federal legislature, is to ensure that a certain number of members are
present before a body can transact business.”).
It is interesting to note that there are generally no quorum requirements for some of the most important
occasions of voting in our polity: elections by the general public of people to public office. Here, then,
election by minority majority is entirely possible, and indeed is quite common.
28
Id. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ___ (8th ed. 2004) (defining “quorum” as “[t]he minimum
number of members (usu. a majority of all the members) who must be present for a deliberative assembly
to legally transact business”). Legislators may on occasion use a quorum requirement as a way to preclude
9
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Luther Cushing, a nineteenth century expert at parliamentary procedure,
explained that quorum requirements “prevent matters from being concluded in a hasty
manner, or agreed to by so small a number of the members, as not to command a due and
proper respect.”29 Cushing’s brief statement suggests no fewer than three goals that
quorum requirements can be said to further. First, requiring some minimal number of
participants serves to encourage deliberation and collegiality among the participants.30
Second, a quorum requirement ensures that some minimal number of actors will vote,
which increases the probability that the result reached by those who do participate is the
same result that would have been reached were all the members of the body to have
participated.31 Third, quorum requirements affirm the legitimacy of the decision reached,
the decisionmaking process, and of the body itself.32
the legislature from taking certain actions. See, e.g., See Robert H. Freilich, Ryan M. Manies & Corey J.
Mertes, The Freilich Report 2003-04: The Supreme Court in an Age of Secrecy and Fear, 36 URB. LAW.
583, 604 (2004) (describing how Democratic state legislators in Texas fled the state in an attempt to deny
Republicans a quorum to effect redistricting). See also James C. Ho, Ensuring the Continuity of
Government in Times of Crisis: An Analysis of the Ongoing Debate in Congress, 53 CATH. U. L. REV.
1049, 1065 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“At the Constitutional Convention, proponents and opponents of the
quorum rule alike understood that by ensuring a minority of members could not exercise the powers of
Congress, the majority quorum requirement effectively empowered states to shut down Congress by
refusing to select and send representatives. Alexander Hamilton specifically acknowledged this
possibility . . . .”)
29
LUTHER S. CUSHING, RULES OF PROCEEDING AND DEBATE IN DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES 27 (5th ed.
1899).
30
On the importance of deliberation to judicial decisionmaking on multimember courts, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 100-02 (1986). On the
importance of collegiality, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality]; Harry T. Edwards,
Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998).
31
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 21, at 1033 (“The purpose of a quorum requirement is to ensure that
the probability the body will reach a ‘correct decision’ will never drop below a certain level.”); Dan S.
Felsenthal, Averting the Quorum Paradox, 36 BEHAV. SCI. 57, 57 (1991) (“Underlying the requirement for
a quorum is the intuitive assumption that the larger the quorum the higher will be the probability that the
voting body will reach a ‘correct decision,’ i.e., the same decision that would have been reached if the body
were fully assembled.”). In fact, increasing the quorum requirement will not uniformly increase the
probability that the decision reached will be the same decision that the entire body would have reached.
See Felsenthal, supra, at 60 (establishing this for situations where majority rule governs); id. at 61-62
(reaching same conclusion where supermajority rule governs). For example, where majority rule governs,
the probability will decrease where the increase in the number of participants results in an even number of
participants. Thus, Professor Felsenthal argues that, regardless of the applicable quorum requirement,
where majority rule governs, the probability will be maximized where any ties that result from an even
number of participants are broken randomly. See id. at 60-61.
32
Professors Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager explain:
We understand that the author of the majority opinion writes, not for herself, but for the Court.
While the author and other members of the majority clearly endorse both the outcome in the case
and the rationale, the opinion does not necessarily correspond to the opinion she would write were
she the sole member of a single-judge court. Put differently, the author of the majority states: “For
the following reasons, we decide this case this way,” rather than “I decide this case this way.” As a
consequence, the majority opinion does not necessarily state the author's view of what legal regime
would be best, all things considered. The author of the majority opinion may hold personal views
that differ in some respect from the views articulated in the majority opinion. For example, a
Justice who believes that the death penalty, regardless of how administered, is unconstitutional,
10
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The common law recognized the importance of quorum requirements, and
established a presumptive quorum requirement equal to a majority of the members of a
body.33 When drafting the United States Constitution, the Founders decided to include in
it a quorum requirement for the two houses of the federal legislature. Section 5 of Article
I provides that “a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business.”34
With respect to the federal judiciary, in contrast, the Constitution is silent. Here,
Congress has acted to establish quorum requirements for the federal courts.35 Table 1
may appropriately base a majority opinion striking down a capital punishment statute on
significantly more narrow grounds.
Even a Justice who dissents from the outcome or the rationale typically acknowledges her
respect for the majority, who, by virtue of its preponderance of numbers, acts for the Court. Thus, a
dissenting Justice often styles her disagreement in the case before her as a disagreement with the
“Court,” not with the “majority.” The exceptions to this rhetorical practice may bespeak a special
degree of disagreement, or signal a special disrespect.
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1993) (footnote omitted).
33
See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1182 (2000). In his Second Treatise on
Government, John Locke argued that “the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole.” Williams,
supra note 21, at 1033 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 142 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) (1690)). See also id. at 1048 (noting Thomas
Jefferson’s explanation that, “under normal circumstances, the Virginia assembly operated under a majority
quorum requirement, but had recently lowered its quorum number to forty members in the face of the
‘present dangerous invasion’” (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in WRITINGS 251
(MERRILL D. PETERSON ed., 1984) (1781- 82)).
34
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 1. In fact, the Framers considered, and rejected, proposals for both
submajority and supermajority quorum rules. For discussion, see Williams, supra note 21, at 1037-56.
The Civil War and the accompanying secession of states raised questions about the proper scope of
congressional quorum rules. For discussion, see David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1131, 1176 & n.231 (2006); for an argument that congressional quorums were properly met for
enactment of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments, even with the exclusion of southern states, see
John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 378 n.11
(2001).
Today the houses of Congress use a definition of quorum that is more lenient than the constitutional
standard. See, e.g., John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional
Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 1013 (2004) (“The House has historically defined its quorum more
leniently than the Constitution's definition, which requires a majority of the body. Currently, House
precedents hold that a quorum is a majority of those ‘chosen, sworn and living.’” (footnote omitted)); see
also Ho, supra note 28, at 1067.
35
Quorum requirements are also very relevant to federal agencies. “Agency quorum and voting
requirements are established by statute or, in the absence of a statutory provision, by agency regulation or
tradition.” Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1182. “Absent a statutory provision, . . . most multi-member
federal agencies follow the common law ‘majority of the quorum’ rule, which means that a quorum is
needed before the agency may act, but only a majority of the quorum is needed for action once a quorum is
constituted.” Id.
Quorum requirements have combined with transparency requirements to achieve some arguably
undesirable results. Sunshine laws generally require that official meetings at which agencies transact
business be part of the public record. This may create a disincentive against agency commissioners
declining to gather informally in numbers in excess of the applicable quorum requirement, lest the
gathering retroactively be deemed an official meeting. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91
IOWA L. REV. 885, 922 (2006) (“Scholars have long known that governmental bodies will shift decision11
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summarizes how Congress has varied the size of the Supreme Court, and the quorum
requirement, over time. Under current statutory authority, the quorum for the ninemember Supreme Court is set at six.36 Thus, at present, the statutory quorum requirement
exceeds the level called for by the common law.37 This was not always true; for example,
from 1837 to 1863, the Court by statute also consisted of nine Justices but with a mere
five-Justice quorum requirement.

making processes in response to open government requirements. . . . Thus, for example, members of a
legislative or regulatory body subject to open meetings and public records laws may communicate with
each other or meet by means (such as by person-to-person oral communications or in less than a quorum)
such that the ‘information’ they produce falls outside the ambit of applicable state transparency
requirements.”). The problem has arisen under the federal Sunshine Act. See, e.g., Randolph May,
Reforming the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 417 (1997) (“Unable to deliberate together in private,
agency members resort to communicating with each other in writing, through staff, or in one-on-one
meetings with other members (assuming the agency has more than three members so that even one-on-one
meetings are allowable).”); Special Committee, Administrative Conference of the U.S., Report &
Recommendation by the Special Committee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 421, 422-23 (1997) (citing “extensive and credible testimony that the restrictions imposed by the Act
have had the effect of not only diminishing discussions on the merits of issues before agencies, but also
preventing debate concerning agency priorities and the establishment of agency agendas, even though such
discussions of a preliminary nature may not technically constitute a ‘meeting’ otherwise required to be held
in public under the Act” (footnotes omitted)). It also has arisen under state law analogs. See, e.g., Fenster,
supra, at 922 n.161.
36
See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The six-Justice quorum requirement is repeated in Supreme Court Rule
4(2).
In the event that an appeal as of right (from a district court) lies to the Supreme Court and a minimal
quorum of the Court is not available, Congress has provided by statute that, “if a majority of the qualified
justices shall be of opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next ensuing term, the court
shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with
the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006). See, e.g., Haig
v. Bissonette, 485 U.S. 264 (1988) (per curiam affirmance under section 2109).
37
E.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
643, 646 n.17 (2002) (“By setting a supermajority quorum requirement, Congress not only prevents binding
precedent from being established by three Justices in a three to two decision, but also prevents even a
unanimous majority of the Court from acting in a five to zero decision.”).
Note that it is also possible to allow quorum requirements to fall below the common law majority
standard. For example, the Delaware Business Code permits corporations to set a quorum requirement as
low as 1/3 for corporate boards of directors. Williams, supra note 21, at 1036.
12
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Table 1 – Supreme Court Membership and Quorum Requirements Over Time
Year(s)
Number of Seats on Court
Quorum Requirement
1789-1801
6
4
1801-1802
5
4
1802-1807
6
4
1807-1837
7
438
1837-1863
9
5
1863-1866
10
6
1866-186939
9/8
6
1869-present
9
6

The quorum requirement for panels of courts of appeals and en banc sittings of
courts of appeals is set statutorily as “[a] majority of the number of judges authorized to
constitute a court or panel thereof.”40 Thus has Congress adopted the common law
quorum rule for use by the federal courts of appeals.

38

In fact, the 1807 Act did not specify a quorum. Instead, they simply “carried over the previous
quorum of four.” Hearings before Subcomm. No. 4 of the Comm. of the Judiciary of the House of Rep. on
H.R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1943) (statement of Charles Warren). Since four—the majority, and
also the quorum, of the previous six-member Court—was also the majority of the new seven-member
Court, “there was no necessity to change th[e] [quorum] provision.” Id. However, “apparently, in order to
be perfectly certain on the subject, there was an amendatory act dealing with some other provisions as to
the Court, passed in 1829, when the Court was still seven, and in that they specifically said that four should
constitute a quorum.” Id.
39
The Act of 1866 provided that no vacancies were to be filled until there were only seven Justices, at
which point any four of them would constitute a quorum. Only two vacancies arose, however, so that the
Court only fell to a level of eight Justices, of which six constituted a quorum pursuant to the 1863 Act.
40
28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (2006).
An en banc sitting of a federal court of appeals generally consists of all active circuit judges plus, in
addition, any senior circuit judges from that circuit on the original panel hearing of the case to be heard en
banc. Id. § 46(c). A special rule, however, allows courts of appeals with more than 15 active judges to
proceed with en banc hearings with fewer than all the active judges of the court, as prescribed by circuit
rule. See id.; Pub. L. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 20, 1978). The Ninth
Circuit—which is presently statutorily authorized to consist of 28 active circuit judges, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 44(a) (and currently consists of 26 active circuit judges, see List of Ninth Circuit Judges by Senior Status,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/174376a6245fda7888256ce5007d5470/0dbdee40d48f664
08825683c0058477e?OpenDocument (last updated July 9, 2006))—has taken up this invitation, and by
circuit rule allows for en banc hearings with only 15 active circuit judges, drawn by lot (plus, in addition,
any senior circuit judges who sat on the original panel hearing of the case to be heard en banc). 9TH CIR. R.
35-3. The rule provides that, “[i]f a judge whose name is drawn for a particular en banc court is
disqualified, recused, or knows that he or she will be unable to sit . . . , the judge will immediately notify
the Chief Judge who will direct the Clerk to draw a replacement judge by lot.” Id. Thus, en banc hearings
should ordinarily consist of no fewer than 15 active circuit judges; still, presumably, section 46(b) applies
to set the quorum requirement at “[a] majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a court,” or
8. If the minimum size of an en banc court is eight judges, then a majority of that number—i.e., 5 judges of
the 28 seats on the court—is the minimum majority required to issue an opinion for the en ban court. (The
rule does provide for an escape valve of sorts, allowing the court to “order a rehearing by the full court
following a hearing or rehearing en banc.” Id.) See also In re Amendment to Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(b) 646
So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 1994) (Anstead, J., dissenting) (“Under the amendment adopted today, a five-judge
division of a fifteen-judge court will be able to exercise en banc authority for the entire court. Actually,
three judges in the five-judge division will have the authority to control an en banc decision.”).
13
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With a few exceptions,41 state courts generally have followed, and continue to
follow, the common law rule.42 Some states do not have explicit quorum requirements;
instead, they use what I term “action requirements”43—that is, they establish a minimum
number of judges necessary for the court to issue an opinion—to give to an “effective
quorum requirement.” For example, while California state law does not explicitly
provide for a supreme court quorum, the state constitution requires as a prerequisite for
judgment the “[c]oncurrence of 4 judges present at the argument” of the case44; this sets
an effective quorum requirement of four judges, since there is no way that a group of
fewer than four judges can ever issue a judgment in a case.

41

Florida sets a quorum requirement of five justices out of the seven justices on the state supreme court.
See FLA. CONST., art. V, § 3.
One outlier case is Johnson v. State of Ga. ex rel. Brannon, 1 Ga. 271, ___ (1846), where the state
supreme court explained that, insofar as “[t]he law, organizing the Inferior Court, constitutes five justices[,]
. . . [w]e hold the concurrence of a majority of the whole number necessary to the validity of their action.”
42
They have done so, however, as a matter of constitutional provision, statute or rule. E.g., GA.
CONST., art. VI, § 6, ¶ I (setting the number of justices on the state supreme court as seven, and providing
that “[a] majority shall be necessary to hear and determine cases”); ILL. CONST., art. VI, § 3 (setting size of
state supreme court at seven, and quorum at four); IND. CONST., art, 7, § 2 (providing that “a majority” of
supreme court justices “shall form a quorum”); IND. STAT. § 642.4101 (setting the size of the state supreme
court at five, and the quorum at three); IA. STAT. § 602.4101 (setting the size of the state supreme court at
seven, and providing that “[a] majority of the justices sitting constitutes a quorum, but fewer than three
justices is not a quorum”); KY. CONST. § 110 (“A majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.”). Judicial quorum requirements are not ordinarily left
to courts to decide as a matter of common law. Cf. Logan Scott Stafford, Judicial Coup d’Etat:
Mandamus, Quo Warranto and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 891, 963-64 (1998) (discussing how, after earlier state constitutions had “provided that
any two of the three supreme court justices constituted a quorum,” the drafters of the 1868 state
constitution “[i]nexplicably . . . added two justices to the court but failed to address how many of the five
justices had to present in order for the court to conduct business,” and how, as a result, confusion reigned as
to whether the court could function in the absence of a single justice, even after the state legislature tried to
clarify matters by statute).
43
See infra Part II.A.2.
44
CAL. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
14
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2. Requirements to Take Actions with Respect to
Cases
It goes without saying that an applicable quorum requirement sets a minimum bar
for taking actions with respect to cases: If the quorum requirement is not met, then the
court cannot conduct business and, a fortiori, cannot render decisions.
Some courts have requirements in excess of the quorum requirement, however.
For example, the Illinois Constitution establishes a seven-member state supreme court, of
which “[f]our Judges constitute a quorum and the concurrence of four is necessary for a
decision.”45 Thus, while five Illinois Supreme Court Justices constitute a quorum, an
opinion that garners only three of the five could not be issued as an opinion of the court.46
Other courts have, or have had, similar requirements that are applicable only to
cases that fall within particular subject-matter areas—usually constitutional law. For
example, for a time in the 1800s, the United States Supreme Court had a “practice”—
grounded in neither the Constitution nor statute47—of “not (except in cases of absolute
necessity) . . . deliver[ing] any judgment in cases where constitutional questions are
involved, unless four judges concur, thus making the decision that of a majority of the
whole court.”48
45

ILL. CONST., art. VI, § 3.
See Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 1332 (Ill. 1984) (“In this case a judge of
this court has recused himself and the remaining members of the court are divided in their views of the case
. . . , so that the constitutionally required concurrence of four judges cannot be secured. . . . Under these
circumstances, we shall let stand the . . . judgment of the Appellate Court . . . .”).
The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) “requires the inclusion of at least three judges [on a
federal court of appeals panel] in the first instance,” Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82 (2003), and
that, accordingly, “although the two Article III who took part in the decision of petitioners’ appeals would
have constituted a quorum if the original panel had been properly created, it is at least highly doubtful
whether they had any authority to serve by themselves as a panel.” Id. at 83. The Court proceeded to hold
that the mere fact that a quorum of two circuit judges sit on a panel is improper where the third judge on the
panel is not an Article III judge. See id. at 82-83 (explaining that, even though “settled law permits a
quorum [of two] to proceed to judgment when one member of the panel dies or is disqualified,” “the
statutory authority for courts of appeals to sit in panels, 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), requires the inclusion of at least
three judges in the first instance.”).
47
For a modern statement to this effect, see FTC v. Flotill Products, Inc., 389 U.S. 179, 184 n.7 (1967)
(“Congress has prescribed a quorum of six Justices for this Court but has not provided how many of the
quorum can act for the Court.”).
48
Briscoe v. Commonwealth’s Bank of the State of Ky., 33 U.S. 118, 122 (1834). In Briscoe, because
“four judges [did] not concur in opinion as to the constitutional questions” raised, the Court directed the
cases at bar “to be reargued at the next term, under the expectation that a larger number of the judges may
then be present.” Id. The Court took matters a step farther in Mayor of N.Y. v. Miln, indicating that it did
not matter whether in fact four Justices concurred on constitutional matters, stating: “The court cannot
know whether there will be a full court during the term; but as the court is now composed, the
constitutional cases will not be taken up.” 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 85, 85 (1835). (The Court at the time consisted
of six Justices. See id. at 85 n.a.)
This is no longer the Court’s practice. See Recent Case, Supremacy Clause—State Court is Not Bound
by 4-3 Decision of United States Supreme Court: Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1307, 1314 & 1315 n.50 (1973) (suggesting that the Supreme Court “might well reexamine the wisdom of
declaring a statute unconstitutional by a vote of less than a majority of its full membership,” but not
46
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While the Supreme Court no longer requires a higher number of concurrences for
cases raising constitutional questions, it does in some situations require minimal numbers
of Justice to concur in order to take certain actions in respect of the case. The most
prominent of these rules is the so-called “rule of four,” under which four Justices must
vote affirmatively in order for a petition for certiorari to be granted.49 Thus, at least four
Justices must concur before the Court may hear most cases.
There are three aspects of action requirements that are worthy of note. First, such
a requirement can be a majority requirement—such as the old Court practice not to issue
opinions in constitutional cases absent the agreement of Justices equaling a majority of
seats on the Court—or a submajority requirement50—such as the “rule of four.”
Conceivably, an action requirement could take the form as well of a supermajority rule.51

advocating a return to the practice of “refusing to hear a constitutional case if the full Court is not
present”).
49
See generally Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068-1109 (1988). On the history of the “rule of four,” see Edward A. Hartnett,
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1643, 1674-90 (2000); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1014 (1983); Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 978-88 (1957). For a
description by the Supreme Court itself of the “rule of four,” see Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery,
349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955) (explaining that “certiorari was granted, according to our practice, because at least
four members of the Court” viewed certiorari as warranted).
The Court applies a similar “rule of four” to determine whether cases on the Court’s appeals docket
should be fully briefed and argued. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
mem.); Revesz & Karlan, supra, at 1110 n.173. The Court applies a “rule of three” to hold a case pending
disposition of another case. See Watson v. Butler, 483 U.S. 1037, 1038 (1987) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); Revesz & Karlan, supra, at 1111. The Court applies a majority rule to dismiss previously
granted certiorari petitions as improvidently granted. See Revesz & Karlan, supra, at 1082.
An action requirement that extends beyond a mere quorum for federal courts of appeals panels is the
requirement that the panel initially be composed of three Article III judges, even if judgment is ultimately
rendered (because of illness, for example) only by two judges. See supra note 46 (discussing Nguyen v.
United States).
50
For general discussion of submajority voting rules, see Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing
Accountability upon Majorities (unpublished manuscript; SSRN # 495569).
51
In some sense, a submajority rule that functions as a hurdle to one outcome also functions as a
supermajority hurdle to the opposite outcome. Thus, just as the “rule of four” empowers four of nine
Supreme Court Justices to grant a petition for certiorari, so too does it empower six Justices to deny it. See
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 30, at 99 (“[T]he rules ‘Four votes are required to grant certiorari’ and
‘Six votes are required to defeat certiorari’ on a nine-judge court are distinguished only by the impact of
abstentions.”).
As I explain below, Evan Caminker and Jed Shugerman have suggested that the Court adopt
supermajority rules to effectuate deference to Congress on the constitutionality of statutes, while Jacob
Gersen and Adrian Vermeule have made a similar suggestion to effectuate deference to agencies on
interpretations of law. I also explain, however, that these voting rule proposals are not action requirements,
in that they simply would establish the voting rule needed to reach a result; they would not be prerequisites
to the Court taking any action at all. See infra note 62.
16
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Second, the requirement need not be, but is generally, engrafted upon, and works
in tandem with, a quorum requirement.52 For example, the “rule of four” is superimposed
upon the Court’s quorum requirement. Thus, certiorari could not be granted even though
four Justices so cast votes if a quorum were not present.
Third, the requirements could, but generally do not, vary with the number of
judges actually available to act. Thus, for example, the “rule of four” could be relaxed to,
say, a “rule of two or three” where fewer than nine Justices are available to vote on a
certiorari petition.53 It seems, however, that such relaxation does not ordinarily (if ever)
occur,54 nor does it seem to occur at the state court level.55 This has important
ramifications for the percolation of issues to the Supreme Court and state high courts, as I
discuss below.56

52

This is subject to the exception that a few states have action requirements but no quorum
requirements. In these circumstances, the action requirement establishes an effective quorum requirement.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
53
Lubet, supra note 17, at 662 n.26 (“Nothing apart form self-restraint prevents the [C]ourt from
granting review on the basis of three votes, or even two.”); Stevens, supra note 49, at 14-21 (treating the
“rule of four” as a judge-made rule that may be entitled to stare decisis deference).
54
See id. at 662 (“No provision reduces th[e requirement of four] or makes any other adjustment when a
Justice is disqualified.” (footnotes omitted)).
Existing caselaw makes clear that the votes of four Justices are still required even where only eight
Justices sit. See, e.g., Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018, 1018-23 (1985); see also Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (Brennan, J., mem.) (indicating that the “rule of four” that governs
whether to grant a full briefing and oral argument to a case pending on the Court’s appeal docket applies as
well in a case where only eight of nine Justices participate in decision).
Whether four votes still are required where only seven (or six) Justices sit is less clear. Justice Douglas
stated in his capacity as Circuit Justice and also in an address to a bar association that three votes would
suffice. See Pryor v. United States, 404 U.S. 1242, 1243 (1971) (Douglas, Circuit Justice) (“Three out of
seven are enough to grant a petition for certiorari.”); William O. Douglas, Managing the Docket of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 25 REC. OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 279, 298
(1970). Yet the Court has subsequently denied certiorari over the dissents of three Justices with seven
Justices participating. See, e.g., Lewis v. Adamson, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990); Delaware State Bd. Of Educ. v.
Evans, 434 U.S. 880 (1977). Dean Revesz and Professor Karlan explain:
Justice Douglas’s papers reveal that in 1969, when the Court was operating with only eight
Justice as a result of the resignation of Justice Abe Fortas, it held cases in which three Justices had
voted to grant certiorari pending a possible fourth vote by Justice Fortas’s replacement. But it did
not grant certiorari based only on three votes. It is not clear whether three out of seven votes are
sufficient to grant certiorari.
Revesz & Karlan, supra note 49, at 1071 n.9. The two major federal procedural treatises are similarly
inconclusive, see Drew S. Days, III, 22 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 405.03[2][a][vii][A]
(2007); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4004.2 (2007), although Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue that, “[s]o long as the Rule of Four persists, it
should mean that three votes are sufficient at least when only seven justices pass on the petition,” id.
I consider below the wisdom of reducing the “rule of four” (or analogous rule for courts consisting of
more or less than nine judges) in connection with the question of how much stare decisis effect court
decisions are to be given. See infra the text accompanying notes 160-166.
55
See, e.g., Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Ky. 2006) (“In order for a motion for
discretionary review to be granted by the Kentucky Supreme Court, the movant must receive at least four
votes. The four-vote requirement remains, regardless of whether six or seven justices actually hear the case.
Thus the recusing justice is effectively casting a vote against the petitioning party.”).
56
See infra text accompanying notes 161-166.
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b. Voting Rule Requirements
Assuming that (i) a court meets the quorum requirement and (ii) the court meets
whatever additional requirements may be in place to issue a decision, the next question
that arises is the choice of voting rule that will govern.57 Multimember courts in the
common law tradition have resolved matters on majority grounds as a longstanding
matter. This applies to two aspects of a court’s function: the resolution of the pending
case, and the reasoning. I focus on the resolution of cases in the next Subsection, and on
precedential value in the Subsection thereafter.
1. Resolution of Cases
Majority rule is as old58 as it is widespread.59 There is debate over whether, by
expressly identifying settings in which supermajority votes are required and otherwise
remaining silent as to applicable voting rules, the Constitution implicitly requires the use
of majority rule under expressly provided otherwise.60 Be that as it may, courts in the
57

Action requirements—which I categorize as a prerequisite for issuing a decision—may themselves be
constituted as voting rules. Indeed, the “rule of four” for granting certiorari petitions is one such example.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text. I distinguish action requirements from voting rules that apply in
resolving cases in that the former simply apply to decide whether or not the court will act with respect to
the particular case. As such, a failure to meet an applicable action requirement means that the court will
take no action and that, accordingly, the status quo will continue to prevail. In other words, the “rule of
four” renders the status quo a “favored state” that only four affirmative votes will allow the Court to
disturb. (Even if one contends that the decision to leave intact the status quo is in some sense an
affirmative “resolution” of a case, see Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm
for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 106 & n.110 (2003), the fact remains that the action
requirement determines the choice between “favored” status quo state and the possibility of altering the
status quo.) Cf. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 30, at 99 (explaining that the introduction of a favored
state makes a submajority rule workable, and citing the “rule of four” as an example).
58
See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA.
L. REV. 971, 975 (1989) (noting that Orestes’ fate at trial in Aeschylus’ play Eumenides is decided by
majority vote); Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The
Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133, 181-82 (1999) (“Simple
majority rule is the historical rule followed in almost all cases for hundreds of years . . . .”); id. at 180
(noting that, at the time of the constitutional convention, “almost all decisions in legislative bodies such as
the British Parliament and Colonial assemblies were taken by majority vote”). .
59
E.g., H. ROBERT, ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED 3 (1970) (“The basic principle of
decision in a deliberative assembly is that . . . a proposition must be adopted by a majority vote.”); A.
STURGIS, STURGIS STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 3-8 (1950) (identifying as one of
eleven basic principles underlying parliamentary law the notion that “[t]he vote of the majority decides”);
King, supra note 58, at 181-82 (“Simple majority rule . . . is the default rule in all legislative bodies, and is
part of the intellectual foundation of American democracy.”).
The U.S. Constitution does provide for the use of supermajority rules in limited circumstances. For an
overview, and a defense of the use of such rules, see, for example, John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002). Legislative rules also
sometimes establish supermajority rules. The requirement of a supermajority to stop a filibuster is one such
example; it has recently risen in importance in the context of judicial confirmations. See, e.g., Jonathan
Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2187-89 (2006). For discussion and a defense,
see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543 (2005) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Supermajority Rules].
60
Compare Michael Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1591 n.134 (2000) with Jed Handelsman
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United States (and beyond) have almost always employed majority rule.61 Resolution of
cases—that is, whether the appellate court will affirm, reverse, remand, or vacate the
lower court’s judgment—is almost always decided by a majority of sitting judges.62
Even where judges are unable to form a majority as to the rationale of a decision, there
will generally be a majority to resolve the case.63 Indeed, where sincere voting by
Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV.
893, 988 & n.535 (2003) (contesting Paulsen’s argument, at least as applied to the federal judiciary).
61
See Saul Levmore, More than Mere Majorities, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 759, 765 (“[T]here is almost
universal convergence on the requirement of an absolute majority coalition for . . . ‘disposition,’ or the
immediate, enforceable result affecting the litigants.”).
In the rare case in which the judges on an appellate court tie as to the proper outcome, the lower court’s
opinion is deemed to be affirmed by the equally divided court. E.g., Hartnett, supra note 37, at 652
(noting the “principle” that “applies generally in multimember bodies” that “the body cannot take any
affirmative action based on a tie”). The rule for ties effectively arises out of the requirement that a majority
resolve a case: Since affirmative action on a case requires a majority, the court “cannot take any affirmative
action based on a tie.” Id. See also Cochran v. Commonwealth, 521 S.E.2d 287, 288-89 (Va. 1999)
(interpreting statute directing that, “[i]n all cases decided by the In all cases decided by the court en banc,
the concurrence of at least a majority of the judges sitting shall be required to reverse a judgment, in whole
or in part,” to mean that a tie en banc vote properly results in an affirmance of the court below, even if the
original court of appeals panel voted to reverse the court below).
As I discuss below, affirmances by an equally divided court are of no precedential value. See infra note
63.
62
Currently two states—Nebraska and North Dakota—have constitutional requirements for the
invalidation of statutes on state constitutional grounds by the state supreme court. See Evan H. Caminker,
Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND.
L.J. 73, 91-93 (2003). For discussion of the experience of Ohio, which had such a requirement from 1912
through 1968, see Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Supermajorities and the Validity of Statutes: How Mapp
Became a Fourth Amendment Landmark Instead of a First Amendment Footnote, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
441 (2001). For discussion of how consideration of quorum requirements affected the drafting of the Ohio
state constitutional supermajority requirement as well as its implementation, see id. at 446, 449 and id. at
458, 461, respectively.
Over the years, there have been numerous congressional proposals—none of them successful—to
impose a supermajority requirement for the Supreme Court to invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds.
See Shugerman, supra note 60, at 998-1001 (reviewing such proposals). Recently, Professor Caminker
and Professor Shugerman have each advanced such proposals—whether by means of a congressional
statute or by unilateral Court action—as a response to what they perceive to be a decrease in deference on
the part of Justices to the presumed constitutionality of congressional statutes. See Caminker, supra;
Shugerman, supra note 60. And Professors Gersen and Vermeule have argued that judicial deference to
administrative agencies, as called for under the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837 (1984), should be implemented by means of a voting rule. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007) (calling for implementation of Chevron deference by
requiring a supermajority Supreme Court or court of appeals vote in order to invalidate an agency
interpretation of law).
Note that proposals such as these differ from the Court’s practice in the early nineteenth century of
refusing to issue opinions in constitutional cases when fewer than a majority of Justices authorized to hear
cases concurred in the judgment, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The latter type of
requirement limits the ability of the Court to act at all in the face of a constitutional challenge; as such, I
categorize it as an “action requirement.” A requirement of a supermajority vote to invalidate a statute as
unconstitutional, in contrast, is not a prerequisite to the court taking action; presumably, if a court fails to
generate a supermajority, then the result is not that no action is taken, but rather that the statute is held to be
constitutional.
63
See generally Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN L. 87 (2002).
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Supreme Court Justices would not generate a majority as to disposition, the practice—
required neither by Constitution, statute, nor even at any point by a majority of sitting
Justices—is for one Justice to change his or her vote so as to provide such a majority.64
Commentators have identified several justifications for courts’ widespread
reliance upon majority rule.65 First, unlike submajority and supermajority rules,66
majority rule will be uniquely decisive as between two alternatives.67 This is often the
case for appellate courts, which frequently decide between affirming and reversing a
lower court’s decision. However, it is not always the case,68 and when the court is asked
to choose among more than two alternatives, the virtue of majority rule—that it selects
the single, correct outcome—becomes inapplicable.69 Nonetheless, majority rule remains
of value: To the extent that one outcome in fact is preferable to every other outcome—
The vote of an equally divided court is deemed to affirm the lower court’s ruling on the ground that a
majority is needed to disturb the status quo. Such an affirmance does not constitute a ruling on the merits.
See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972) (affirmance by equally divided Court was neither a
ruling on the merits nor was it entitled to precedential effect, and accordingly did not preclude a subsequent
petition for habeas corpus relief on the same grounds).
64
See H. Ron Davidson, The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 17, 17-19
(2004). (Because there is no statute or rule—or even anything as broad as a Court practice—that a majority
on resolution is required before the Court will decide a case, I do not categorize the Screws practice as an
action requirement.)
65
But cf. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 81-82 (1962) (noting that “on a priori grounds there is
nothing in the analysis that points to any uniqueness in the rule that requires a simple majority to be
decisive,” and that “[a]n alternative, and much more plausible, explanation for the predominant role that
majority rule has achieved in modern democratic theorizing may be found when we consider that most of
this theory has been developed in noneconomic, nonindividualistic, nonpositivistic terms”)
66
Professors Kornhauser and Sager explain:
If one adopts a sub-majority rule, the court could reach two or more outcomes simultaneously, and
these could be starkly contradictory in nature. For all super-majority rules, the court could fail to
reach any outcome at all. . . .
In practice, sub- and super-majority rules are made workable by the addition of favored or
default states. Where sub-majority rules are at play, typically one outcome is favored, in the sense
that it would be adopted if it receives k votes, whether or not some other outcome also receives k.
. . . Where super-majority rules are at play, one outcome is the default state, in the sense that if no
other outcome receives k votes the default state will prevail.
Favored and default states make sub- and super-majority rules decisive.
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 30, at 99. The “rule of four,” applicable to granting certiorari petitions, is
an example of a submajority rule that is made decisive by the designation of a “favored state”: that the
petition be granted. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
67
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 30, at 99 (“Where there are only two possible outcomes, simple
majority rule emerges as uniquely decisive; it alone always identifies a single, correct outcome. But when
we allow more than two possible outcomes, this property of majority rule disappears.”).
68
Consider the appellate court that must decide among affirming, reversing, or vacating a lower court’s
decision, or Dean Levmore’s example of a court that must decide among granting no relief, injunctive
relief, or monetary relief. See Levmore, supra note 63, at 99.
69
See supra note 67. The Jury Theorem might extend some of its predictive power to plurality votes
over more than two options. See Levmore, supra note 63, at 118-19; Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet
Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.,
125, 131-32 (2002). This extension, however, is of greater use in settings, such as questions of precedent,
where there often are more than two options from which to choose. See infra the text accompanying notes
87-88.
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i.e., would defeat each other outcome in a series of pairwise majority votes—majority
rule is the one rule that will always select this so-called “Condorcet winner.”70
Second, majority rule tends to foster deliberation. It does this by empowering no
voter over any other, and favoring no outcome over any other.71 At the same time, Dean
Levmore notes, supermajority rule also might encourage useful deliberation in certain
settings. For example, where voters know
that a simple majority will prevail, then—especially if the issue before them is one that
falls easily into a choice between two options—they might impatiently rush to vote. A
rule requiring a supermajority decision might in this way encourage deliberation, which
. . . might raise the probability of the group getting the matter right.72

However, Dean Levmore goes on to observe that this view “avoids the question of why a
group whose members are intent on getting something right would unwisely rush to a
simple majority vote. If deliberation improves the chance of correctness, then we should
expect uncorrupted groups to deliberate when there is expected benefit from
deliberation.” It would seem that judicial reliance upon majority rule thus accords with
the general perception that judges seek to resolve questions correctly and at least at some
level rise above politics73 (even to the extent that this is not the reality74).
Third, the Condorcet Jury Theorem predicts that, “[w]here each voter has more
than an even chance of being right on some matter, then the more voters we have the
closer we get to a probability of 1.0 of getting the matter right by abiding by a (simple)
majority vote.”75 While the fact that more than a majority of voters opts for one option in
a given situation may lend even more credence to the view that that option is the correct
70

See Levmore, supra note 58, at 988. For this reason, majority rule is a “Condorcet-producing rule.”
Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 86 (1996); see also
supra note 66. Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 62, at 709-10 (arguing that “neutrality should be
rejected” where Chevron mandates that deference be given to agency interpretations).
72
Levmore, supra note 63, at 90.
73
See Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into the Perceived Quality of
Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (setting out reasons why judges and courts seek to
reach “correct” results). To the extent that this is not accurate, then the Condorcet Jury Theorem may be
inapplicable. See infra note 75.
74
Cf. Nash, supra note 59, at 2203 (arguing that, to the extent that public perception of an apolitical
judiciary is inaccurate, it might be desirable to remove the veneer).
75
Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 735 (2001).
The application of the Jury Theorem to multimember courts can be questioned. First, one might ask
whether decisions of law can always, often, or ever be categorized as “correct.” See Nash & Pardo, supra
note 73, and the authorities cited therein. Second, one might ask whether the availability—indeed, the
desirability—of deliberation among judges implicates the applicability of the Jury Theorem to the setting of
multimember courts. The traditional Jury Theorem applies in the absence of deliberation—i.e., its proof
rests only on the assumption that each voter has a greater than 50 percent likelihood of voting for the
correct answer. See Levmore, supra note 63, at 90 (“A Jury Theorem purist might say that the simple
result is ruined if voters are given the opportunity to influence one another (as with certain kinds of vote
trading), to exhibit herd mentality, or to otherwise allow their own assessments and self-esteem to interfere
with the value of numerosity.”). At the same time, one can see the availability of deliberation presumably
as enhancing the Jury Theorem’s prediction. See id. (noting that “deliberation has potential value on the
Theorem's own terms” in that it “might reveal the presence of expertise, in which case each voter is no
longer to be regarded as equally likely to be right”).
71
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one,76 the Jury Theorem does not—and should not—itself impose a supermajority
requirement. As Dean Levmore explains, “The danger of a supermajority requirement is
that it may pass up right answers by allowing the minority to prevail, and the minority is,
by assumption, less likely to be ‘right’ than is the majority.”77
2. Requirements for Stare Decisis Effect
The previous Subsection made clear the dominance of, and justification for, the
use of majority rule to resolve cases. In this Subsection, I examine the voting rules
applicable to determining the rationale, and precedential value, of a court decision.
The rationale for a court’s ruling is of importance to the litigants, and may also be
important to lower courts on remand. In addition, future litigants and courts may look to
other courts that have faced similar issues.78 Opinions of other courts may be of
persuasive value to later courts. Further, thanks to the doctrine of stare decisis, decisions
of courts may actually bind in some sense later courts faced with similar legal issues.
Under so-called horizontal stare decisis, a court is presumptively bound by decisions
issued by earlier incarnations of that court.79 Under vertical stare decisis, lower courts
are bound by pronouncements of superior courts.80
The general rule is that an opinion will not enjoy precedential value unless at least
a majority of judges join it.81 The justifications mirror those applicable to reliance upon
majority rule for disposition of cases.82
The rules governing precedent in cases with no majority opinion are consistent
with the general rule. While tie votes are deemed to affirm the court decision below,83
76

The logic would be that, the more voters who vote for a particular option, the less likely it is that the
convergence toward that option is the result of chance as opposed to the probability (by assumption more
likely than not for each voter) that voters are accurately voting for the correct option.
77
Levmore, supra note 63, at 89; cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 62, at 710-12 (arguing that the
Jury Theorem “supports the expansion of the group whose views are aggregated to include agency
officials,” and that, because the supermajority voting rule they propose “in effect does just that,” the rule is
consistent with the Jury Theorem).
78
See Nash, supra note 57, at 86-87.
79
See Nash & Pardo, supra note 73, at ___.
80
See id. at ___; Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (providing an extended analysis and critique of vertical stare decisis).
81
The rule is most often stated when the absence of a majority precludes precedential effect. See, e.g.,
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910) (“[A]n affirmance by an equally divided court is, as
between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles
of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.”).
That a majority opinion is entitled to precedential effect, however, does not mean that opinions that
attract greater than a majority of judges do not enjoy additional precedential gravitas. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court has indicated that it may take less for the Court to overrule opinions issued by bare
majorities. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. The fact remains, however, that the minimum
requirement for an opinion to enjoy precedential value is that it attract a majority of judges.
82
See supra the text accompanying notes 61-62.
83
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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they give rise to no precedential holding.84 This is consistent with the prerequisite of a
majority for precedential value: Affording a court decision precedential value recognizes
the decision as an affirmative court action. But an affirmative court action requires a
majority85 and, insofar as a tie bespeaks the absence of a majority, a tie decision is
entitled to no precedential effect.86
The rules governing the precedential effect of Supreme Court cases where
resolution attracts a majority but there are only reasoning pluralities have evolved over
time. Still, these rules have retained fealty to the general requirement of a majority.
Historically, federal courts did not accord Supreme Court plurality opinions any
precedential effect,87 which is consistent with the view that the absence of a majority
(here, on rationale) precludes precedential effect. The modern Court, in contrast, has
instructed that subsequent courts should look for the “narrowest” ground common to the
various camps of Justices that compose the majority for disposition.88 This is once
again—albeit in a different sense—consistent with the notion that the creation of binding
precedent turns on the presence of a majority.
Many courts add an additional requirement for a majority decision to acquire stare
decisis weight: The decision must be published.89 Unpublished decisions, by court rule,
are not accorded precedential value and in fact technically may not be cited.90
84

See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History,
Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983). On the murky historical origins of the rule, see
id. at 33-35.
85
See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 37, at 652 (noting the “principle” that “applies generally in
multimember bodies” that “the body cannot take any affirmative action based on a tie”); Davidson, supra
note 64, at 33-34.
86
Some states have enacted provisions that allow a state intermediate court judge to sit by designation
on the supreme court in order to avoid the prospect of a tie vote. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 735 (2003) (discussing a New Jersey
constitutional provision to this effect). See also Entin, supra note 62, at 461 (quoting SIXTH REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO 17 (1943)) (noting that Ohio
changed regime in 1944 to allow court of appeals judge to sit by designation on supreme court to avoid ties,
and also to avoid “plac[ing] an ‘unfair burden’ on appellants challenging the validity of statutes,
particularly when more than one justice did not participate”).
87
Levmore, supra note 63, at 96-97.
88
See id. at 97 (describing the Marks doctrine).
89
For discussion of the considerations that underlie this determination, see Stephen L. Wasby,
Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67
(2004).
90
See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government
Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 944-45 (1989). Whether the
practice of disallowing precedential value (other than for res judicata purposes) is constitutional recently
proved to be quite controversial. Compare Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir.)
(“[W]e conclude that [the local circuit rule], insofar as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of
our prior decisions, purports to expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III, and is therefore
unconstitutional.”), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (2000) (en banc), with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d
1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We believe that Anastasoff overstates the case.”). See generally Symposium,
Have We Ceased to be a Common Law Country?: A Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished,
Withdrawn and Per Curiam Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005); Stephen R. Barnett, NoCitation Rules under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 473 (2003). See
also Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN.
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Another wrinkle that many courts—including the federal courts of appeals and
many supreme courts (though not the United States Supreme Court)—add is reliance
upon panels of judges that constitute less than the full complement of the court in
question. Thus, for example, federal courts of appeals generally sit in panels of three.
The power of the three-judge panel in some ways exceeds what one normally understands
as stare decisis weight:91 No subsequent three-judge panel of the court is empowered to
overrule an earlier holding of a three-judge panel.92 The court en banc, however, is free
to overrule earlier panel holdings (as well as earlier en banc holdings).93 (Presumably,
the en banc court may afford some stare decisis weight to earlier panel and en banc
holdings.94)
L. REV. 1435 (2004) (criticizing practices of unpublication, depublication, and stipulated withdrawal of
judicial opinions).
Historically, many courts had court rules that forbade the citation of unpublished opinions in court
filings. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 90, at 945-46. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were
amended in 2006 to preclude such barriers with respect to newly issued unpublished decisions. See FED. R.
APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for
publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”).
91
Cf. Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 893 (5th Cir. 2001) (“While easily confused
with traditional stare decisis, ‘our rule that one panel cannot overturn another serves a somewhat different
purpose of institutional orderliness.’”).
92
See, e.g., id.
In the event that a later court of appeals panel decision conflicts with an earlier one, the general rule is
that, in spite of the latter decision, the rule announced in the earlier decision remains binding: “[A]s to
conflicts between panel opinions, application of the basic rule that one panel cannot overrule another
requires a panel to follow the earlier of the conflicting opinions.” McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d
329, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). For discussion and justification, see id. at 332-34. But see Graham
v. Contract Transp., Inc., 220 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2000) (“When faced with conflicting precedents we
are free to choose which line of cases to follow . . . .”).
Note that some courts of appeals “permit[] a panel to overrule a prior decision of the court if the panel
first circulates its opinion to the entire court and, depending on the circuit, either no judge objects, or a
majority of judges do not vote to hear the case en banc.” Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little:
Explaining the Sturm und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1429, 1483 n.270 (2005) (citations omitted). In effect, the involvement of all judges on the court makes it
apt to describe these sorts of practices as “‘mini’ en banc proceedings.” See generally Steven Bennett &
Christine Pembroke, “Mini” In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531
(1986).
93
See, e.g., In re Bentz Metal Prods. Co., 253 F.3d 283, 285 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“It is wellestablished that on rehearing en banc, the full court may, and sometimes does, overrule a decision reached
earlier by a three-judge panel in a separate case.”); Bolden v. S.E. Penn. Transportation Auth., 953 F.2d
807, 813 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (to same effect, citing a court internal operating rule). See also VA.
CODE ANN. § 17.1-402(D) (authorizing en banc state court of appeals to “overrule any previous decision by
any panel or of the full court”); Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 562 S.E.2d 139, 143-44 (Va. 2002)
(overruling by court of appeals of earlier panel decision did not violate criminal defendant’s Due Process
rights). For more discussion, see infra the text accompanying notes 114-116.
A grant of rehearing en banc vacates, and renders without precedential value, any decision in the case
issued by a panel of the court. E.g., Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001)
(announcing rehearing en banc); Alvarado v. Bd. of Trustees of Montgomery Comm. Coll., 848 F.2d 457,
459-60 (4th Cir. 1988) (decision to grant en banc review results in vacation of panel opinion, and renders
panel opinion devoid of precedential value).
94
See Bolden, 953 F.2d at 813 (“Because we are setting in banc in this case, we are not bound by
[panel] precedents in the same way that a panel would be bound. . . . Instead, we are constrained only to
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At a minimum, then, a majority is a prerequisite for precedential effect.95 But the
fact that a majority is a prerequisite for precedential value does not end matters. The
question remains: majority of what? The answer to this question is generally a majority
of sitting judges.96 But what if recusals, court vacancies, or illness reduce the number of
sitting judges, such that the majority of sitting judges is less than the majority of the full
court? Is a decision issued by such a majority—a “minority majority”—due precedential
respect? It is this question to which I turn in the next Part.
III.

MINORITY MAJORITIES

In the previous Part, I elucidated that a court may decide a case where the relevant
quorum and action requirements are met. The court’s decision is as a general matter
decided by majority, as are the precedential effects of that decision. Taking these points
together, this means that a majority of a minimal quorum should suffice to give rise to
precedential effect.
What, however, if, as a result of recusals, illness, or vacancies, a majority of
sitting judges numbers less than a majority of the full court? For example, if two United
States Supreme Court Justices are unavailable, then a majority of seven—that is, four
Justices—is all that is required for a majority; yet, four is less than the five Justices that
constitute the minimal majority of the full Court, such that the four Justices can be said to
constitute a “minority majority.”
In this Part, I consider the question of precedential effect of cases decided by a
minority majority. In Section A, I elucidate situations in which cases might be decided
by minority majorities, and I explain why such settings might be problematic.
In Section B, I set out various solutions to the problem. One type of solution is to
institute rules that minimize (or eliminate) the occurrence of minority majorities. A
second type of solution is to vary the precedential weight that minority majority decisions
are accorded.
In Section C, I consider, normatively, what the best strategies are for dealing with
minority majorities. I argue that, for horizontal stare decisis purposes, minority majority
decisions should either not be binding or should only enjoy limited and narrow
the degree counseled by principles of stare decisis.” (citation omitted)); infra note 116 and accompanying
text.
95
That a decision is worthy of precedential effect does not resolve the difficult questions of how much
precedential effect is due. For example, one has to decide whether the decision should be construed
narrowly or broadly, cf. infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text (discussing judicial minimalism), and
to what extent a particular statement is holding or dicta, see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns,
Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). For an exposition of the difficulties in designing, and
implementing, a general rule of stare decisis (at least as to constitutional issues), see David L. Shapiro, The
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008).
96
For courts that authorize panels of less than the full complement of judges to decide cases, the
relevant majority is a majority of judges on the panel.
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precedential power; for vertical stare decisis, minority majority decisions should not be
read broadly.
Last, in Section D, I address questions of institutional choice: Which
institutions—the legislature, the courts by rule, or the courts by case holdings—are
empowered, and best positioned, to address the problem of minority majorities?
A. Understanding the Problem
A case is decided by a minority majority occurs when it is decided by a majority
of sitting judges, yet (because of vacancies and recusals) the majority numbers less than a
majority of the full court (or, in the case of a panel, the number of judges who ordinarily
constitute such a panel).
The first step is to understand the range of cases within which minority majorities
might occur. The minimum possible group out of which a majority might be drawn is a
quorum.97 Thus, for the United States Supreme Court, the smallest possible majority is a
majority 4 out of a quorum of 6.98 For a court of equal size using the common law
quorum requirement—and thus for the Supreme Court of Canada and most nine-member
state supreme courts—the quorum would be 5, and so the minimal majority would be 3 of
5 for common law court of equal size. Table 2 summarizes, for various courts and typical
court structures, the total number of judges, the number of judges ordinarily required for
a majority, the quorum requirement, and the minimum number of judges allowed for a
majority—what I call a “minimum majority.”

97

20 AM. JUR. (Courts) § 159 (“For an opinion to have stare decisis effect, at least a majority of the
members of the court must have joined the opinion. However, a majority may be of a quorum, rather than
of all the sitting judges.”).
For courts that don’t have explicit quorum requirements but do have action requirements, as explained
above, see supra the text accompanying notes 43-44, the action requirement functions as an effective
quorum requirement.
98
E.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2297, 2315 n.49 (1999) (“Technically, the Court needs a majority of a quorum of six to decide a case,
so it takes at least four Justices (of seven sitting) to construct a majority-disposition or majority-opinion
coalition.”).
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TABLE 2: Number of judges, number of judges for ordinary majority, quorum requirement, and minimum
number of judges for majority, for various courts and court structures.
Court
Total Number of
Minimum
Quorum
Minimum
Judges
Majority of
Requirement
Majority of
Whole Court
Quorum
9
5
6
4
U.S. Supreme
Court
3
2
2
299
Typical Federal
Court of Appeals
Panel
Variable
Majority of judges Majority of judges
Majority of
Typical En Banc
on en banc court
on en banc court
Quorum
Federal Court of
Appeals
15
8
8
5
Typical Ninth
Circuit En
Banc100
9
5
5
3
Supreme Court of
Canada
9
5
5
3
Typical 9-Justice
State Supreme
Court
7
4
4
3
Typical 7-Justice
State Supreme
Court
5
3
3
2
Typical 5-Justice
State Supreme
Court

Table 3 sets out the minimum majority requirements for courts, composed of
different numbers of judges, that rely upon the common law quorum rule. Note that all
courts with more than three judges run the risk of having cases decided by minority
majorities. Indeed, note that the difference between the minimum majority of the whole
court and the minimum majority with a simple quorum, as reflected in the last column,
can be as low as zero but gets progressively larger as the size of the court increases. This
means that, especially as the court size increases, the greater the number of majorities that
will satisfy the minimum quorum requirement but are less than the majority of the whole
court.

99

Note, however, that, even if a quorum of two judges may ultimately decide a case, three judges must
constitute the original panel pursuant to statute. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing this
requirement, and characterizing it as an action requirement).
100
See supra note 40.
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Table 3—Comparison of minimum majorities required for courts with common law quorum
requirements101

Court Size
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2

Quorum
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2

Minimum
Majority of
Whole Court
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2

Minimum
Majority with
Simple Quorum
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2

Difference
between
Minimum
Majorities of
Whole Court and
with Simple
Quorum
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0

Why are decisions by minority majorities problematic? The reasons mirror the
justifications for instituting quorum requirements. It bears noting at the outset that these
concerns arise to some degree any time less than the full complement of a court decides a
case. The situation of a case decided by a minority majority is especially problematic,
however, because of the possibility that missing members of the court—or, in the case of
court vacancies, the possibility that those who might join the court—might act in some
way to change the outcome of the case. This, in turn, to some extent undermines the
legitimacy of the outcome in the case, and perhaps also of the court itself.
Let us focus, then, on the outcome of the case. First, in all minority majority
cases lurks the simple possibility that “additional” judges would have voted such that the
majority decision would not have carried the day: Since a minority majority constitutes
less than a majority of the full court, the votes of the additional judges could, at least in
theory, combine with the actual dissenting judges to form a majority of the full court.

101

Generally, the numbers in the table depend upon the remainder when the court size is divided by 4
(mathematically, the equivalent of the number “mod 4”). Every possible court size can be represented by
4N, 4N + 1, 4N + 2, or 4N + 3 where N is some positive integer. Given that, the general table looks as
follows.

Court Size

Quorum

Minimum Majority of
Whole Court

Minimum Majority
with Simple Quorum

Difference between
Minimum Majorities
of Whole Court and
with Simple Quorum

4N + 3
2N + 2
2N + 2
N+2
N
4N + 2
2N + 2
2N + 2
N+2
N
4N + 1
2N + 1
2N + 1
N+1
N
4N
2N + 1
2N + 1
N+1
N
Thus, as the size of the court increases, the difference in minimum majority size will also increase, at a
rate approximately ¼ the rate of increase in the court size.
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Second, consider deliberation and reflection. The absence of some members of a
court may make deliberation less plentiful. It also may affect the content of the
deliberation that does take place. Both these factors may affect the outcome of the case.
Third, consider the notion of representation on the court. In legislatures, the logic
that the diminished legislature will be likely often to reach the same result as it would
have in full is supported by the large size of the legislature to begin with. The absence of
a few legislators is likely to have far less of an impact on a legislature, however, than is
the absence of a few judges (or even one judge) on a court of much smaller size.102
Moreover, the presence identities of those who are present to vote may mean that
certain interests are overrepresented, and in turn that other interests are underrepresented.
While we generally do not think of courts as representative bodies, this may occur in a
couple of ways. First, consider representativeness of varied ideological viewpoints.103
There are courts whose judges are elected, in which case the absence of a judge may
reflect the absence of a particular ideology. Ideological diminishment may also occur on
appointed courts: Here, changes in the executive and legislative branches over time may
tend to secure judges with different ideologies, such that the absence of a judge may
reduce or silence a particular ideology. Indeed, if court vacancies arise, the political
branches may actively work to keep the court membership depleted, depending upon the
current composition of the court and the political orientation of the executive and
legislative branches.104 Second, some courts elect, or call for appointment of judges, on a
geographical basis.105 On such courts, then, the absence of a judge means the absence of
representation of a particular geographic area.
Fourth, consider that the outcome of a court consists not only of the technical
affirmance, reversal, or other disposition of the lower court’s decision, but also of the
reasoning that the court employs. In other words, a majority of a court with diminished
membership may vote for the same disposition of the lower court as would the court of
102

But cf. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 5 (1994) (En banc courts
“resemble a small legislature more than a court.”).
103
The balance of representation between ideologies that espouse activist judging and those that do not
may be of particular importance. Indeed, there are those who argue that activist judges’ votes will tend to
decide more cases, even where all the judges on a court cast votes. See Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote
Twice, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2003)
104
For a general discussion of the politicization of the federal judicial nomination process, see Michael
J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2003). For discussion of recent
examples of such escalations, see, for example, id. at 668-69; McGinnis & Rappaport, Supermajority Rules,
supra note 59, at 545-48; Nash, supra note 59, at 2187-89.
105
For example, the Illinois Constitution calls for judges to be appointed with an eye to geographic
diversity, see ILL. CONST., art. VI, § 3 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of seven Judges. Three shall be
selected from the First Judicial District and one from each of the other Judicial Districts.”), while Louisiana
elects supreme court justices on a geographic basis, see LA. REV. STAT. § 13-101 (dividing the state into
supreme court electoral districts). See also FLA. CONST., art. V, § 3 (“Of the seven justices, each appellate
district shall have at least one justice elected or appointed from the district to the supreme court who is a
resident of the district at the time of the original appointment or election.”). For an argument that the
United States Supreme Court should be a demographically representative body, see Angela OnwuachiWillig, Representative Government, Representative Court? The Supreme Court as a Representative Body,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1252 (2006).
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full complement, yet the reasoning provided by the majority may differ. In particular, it
is logical to expect the grounds for a decision to become narrower as it becomes
necessary to attract more judges in order to constitute a majority. Thus, in general, one
would expect a majority joined only by four judges to be broader than a decision joined
by five.106 In this sense, the ability of a minority majority to issue a decision may affect
the scope of the court’s mandate on remand—and, importantly, its precedential effect—
even if the disposition is technically no different than it would have been had a standard
majority of the full court issued the decision.
Fifth, consider that path dependence may further increase the gulf between a full
court and a diminished court. Most high courts of jurisdictions enjoy discretion over
their docket, and choose to hear cases using some action requirement akin to the Supreme
Court’s “rule of four.” If the threshold for the relevant action requirement does not
change as the court’s complement is reduced—e.g., if the requirement for granting a
petition for writ of certiorari is not reduced below four—then it stands to reason that the
court will hear fewer cases than it would were the court fully staffed, since it will take a
larger percentage of the available judges to grant discretionary review.107 Put another
way, it is likely that there will be cases that the court with a full complement would have
heard that the diminished court will be unable to muster enough votes to hear.
One solution to this problem (that I discuss below108) is to reduce the threshold for
granting discretionary review—for example, one might reduce the “rule of four” to a
“rule of three” where fewer than nine or eight Justices are available on a case.109 This,
however, will often have the opposite result: More cases will be heard than if the full
complement of the court will available. For example, since three out of seven Justices is
a lower threshold than four out of eight,110 a “rule of three in such cases might admit
more cases to the Court’s docket than would the typical “rule of four” for the full ninemember Court.
One way or another, then—i.e., whether the threshold for exercising discretion to
hear cases is relaxed or not—it is likely that the high court’s docket will in some way
change if the full complement of the court is not available to vote. This is likely to be
especially problematic if the reduction is the result of court vacancies that persist.
Indeed, in such cases, one might expect litigants to try to game the system by calculating
that some cases may be easier to be heard under such circumstances.111
106

As Chief Justice Roberts has explained, “The broader the agreement among the justices, the more
likely it is a decision on the narrowest possible grounds.” John G. Roberts, Commencement Address at
Georgetown University Law Center (May 21, 2006).
107
Note that 4/8 > 4/9 and 4/7 > 4/9.
108
See infra notes 160-166 and accompanying text.
109
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
110
Note that 3/7 < 4/9.
111
Cf. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1309 (1995) (arguing that standing rules have developed, and are desirable, because they make it
difficult for ideologically motivated plaintiffs opportunistically to manipulate courts’ dockets); see also
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995)
(drawing on historical evidence and caselaw to bolster this point).
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Beyond the simple point that some cases in fact may have been decided
differently—or that the universe of cases decided may have been changed—the mere
perception that these changes may have occurred will tend to undermine the legitimacy of
the court. Beyond this, the decision of cases—and especially the creation of precedent—
by less than majorities of the full court may seem illegitimate, especially if the practice
were to become more common.
A final point is that the bulk of these problems are of greater concern in terms of
precedential effect. If the result in a case was different than it otherwise would have been
(or if a court decided a case that it otherwise would not have) but the result affected only
the actual litigants in that case, then the effect of the decision—and any accompanying
affront to the court’s legitimacy—would be quite cabined. However, if the court’s
decision has precedential effect—and therefore binds lower courts and even the court that
issued the decision—then the effect of the decision—and the affront to the court’s
legitimacy—will be far more pernicious.
Before turning to possible solutions to the minority majority “problem,” it is
important to examine how decisions by panels of a court—majorities of which will
almost always constitute minority majorities of the entire court, even where all the judges
on the panel agree—are not problematic in the myriad ways that other minority majority
decisionmaking tends to be. The key distinction is that, with panel decisionmaking,
though the remaining judges on the court do not participate directly, they retain a
supervisory role. This supervision manifests itself in three ways. First, as discussed
above, the parties—or the court sua sponte—may choose to hear any case en banc.112 If
this happens, the decision of the panel is revoked; indeed, it thereafter lacks any
precedential value.113 More generally, en banc courts enjoy the freedom to overturn any
prior panel precedent.114 While in theory en banc courts also remain free to reverse prior
en banc decisions,115 it seems to some that en banc decisions enjoy greater stare decisis

112

An en banc hearing may even take place before a panel decision is ever issued, on the basis of the
draft opinion that is circulated to the entire court. See, e.g., United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706 (4th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (“The parties filed briefs and argued before a panel of this court. Prior to the issuance of a
decision, however, a majority of the court voted to rehear the case en banc.”).; Peter Michael Madden,
Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 409
(1974).
Note that on courts such as the Ninth Circuit, where even en banc review consists of less than the entire
complement of judges on the court, provision exists for subsequent “full court” review. See supra note 40.
113
See supra note 93.
114
See supra note 93 and accompanying text. See also See United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912,
920 (1st Cir. 1980) (rejecting argument that, since “one three-judge panel is not authorized to overrule
another,” three-judge en banc court could not overrule original panel decision). But see Robertson Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 14 F.3d 373, 376 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (where court of appeals denied
rehearing en banc with respect to two prior panel decisions but granted it after a third decision, the “only
issue” properly before the en banc court was the propriety of the district court’s latest decision; other issues
under the doctrine of “the law of the case which a majority of the judges of this court so firmly endorsed in
our order denying rehearing en banc”).
115
See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 435 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc court overrules prior en
banc holding on ground that it proved impracticable), rev’d, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
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weight.116 Given the rarity of en banc review,117 however, one needs to consider as well
other reasons that panels do not stray far from what the entirety of the court would
accept.
Second, on some courts that operate through panels, all the judges on the court
will read (or at least have the opportunity to read) all panel opinions before they are
issued.118 Apart from enabling judges to flag cases for en banc review, this gives judges
the opportunity to bring suggestions to the attention of the members of the panel. Panel
members may be willing to modify their opinions in light of these suggestions, whether
out of fear of en banc review, out of a sense of collegiality, or both.
Third, the shadow of possible en banc review, and of having one’s colleagues
read the panel decision—combined with motivations of collegiality—may tend to
moderate the content of panel decisions in the first instance. As Professors Cooper and
Berman explain:
A three-judge panel that confronts a novel or important legal issue
probably should be quite reticent about establishing a definitive precedent
before other judges can have some input. Such reticence might be based in
a circuit judge's general disinclination to speak for and to bind fellow
judges before having some inkling for their views, or based in a circuit
116

See, e.g., James J. Wheaton, Note, Playing with Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges
Required to Grant En Banc Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1529
(1984) (“Because the holdings of three-judge panels may be viewed as less authoritative and perhaps nonbinding for subsequent panel decisions, the en banc hearing or rehearing arguably creates a stronger
precedent for later panel decisions.”); Madden, Comment, supra note 111, at 409 (“While it always remains
a possibility that the outvoted [en banc] minority might try to circumvent the majority, this is less likely in
the face of the more authoritative in banc precedent than it would be where there were merely precedential
panel decisions.”). Cf. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960)
(interpreting judicial code to hold that circuit judge who retired at time of decision by en banc court could
not participate in decision even though he participated, before retirement, in the original panel decision, and
noting that the result allowed active circuit judges to use en banc court to achieve orderly judicial
administration and finality of decisions); Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Ban Review in the
“Mini-Supreme Court”, 13 J.L. & POL. 377, 406 (1997) (relying upon a survey of the subsequent case
history of en banc decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit to support the proposition that “the
Supreme Court, in the vast majority of cases, does not disturb the outcome reached by the courts of appeals
sitting en banc”); Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1621 (2000)
(predicting that, under proposal for composing en banc courts out of judges from multiple circuits, “[e]n
banc panels are . . . likely to refuse to hear cases previously resolved by en banc panels of the same circuit,
and even when they do reconsider issues, they will recognize that they are not writing on blank slates.”).
117
E.g., Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1963) (statement of
Lumbard, C.J.).
118
E.g., James S. Casebolt, Procedures and Policies of the Colorado Court of Appeals, 24 COLO. LAW.
2105, 2110 (1995) (“[E]ach judge [on the court] must . . . review all draft opinions, proposed for
publication.”). Cf. Charles R. Wilson, How Opinions are Developed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, 32 STETSON L. REV. 247, 267 n.107 (2003) (“The members of the Court who are
not members of the three-judge panel will not review a proposed opinion before it is filed with the Court,
except in special cases in which the panel may determine that such review is necessary. Members of the
Court will, however, receive a copy of the opinion before it is issued as a slip opinion by West Publishing
Company.” (citation omitted)).
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judge's candid appreciation that colleagues may be more knowledgeable or
familiar with a particular legal issue. Accordingly, when a particular panel
is forced to confront a consequential legal issue in a less-than-ideal
context, the case for consciously avoiding the issuance of a firm and
conclusive legal decision becomes especially compelling.119
In short, then, panel decisions do not raise the same concerns as do other settings
in which minority majority decisions occur. In other settings, the absence of other
members of the court to supervise the minority majority exacerbates the problem. In the
next Section, I consider steps that might be taken to ameliorate the problem.
B. Solving the Minority Majority Problem
Tables 2 and 3 make clear that larger courts are (at least, if one assumes an equal
likelihood of illness, recusals, and vacancies) more likely to have cases decided by
minority majorities. What, if anything, can be done about it?
The possible strategies can be seen to fall into two categories. First, one might
implement rules that are likely to minimize occurrences of minority majorities. An
increase in the quorum rule is one such solution. Congress has taken such an approach in
respect of the Supreme Court by defining the quorum in excess of the common law
quorum requirement.120 As a result, three Justices—which would be a majority of the
common law quorum of five out of a court of nine judges—cannot issue a majority
opinion. Instead, it takes four Justices to constitute a minority majority of the Supreme
Court—only one less than the minimal majority of the entire Court.
Alternatively, one might reduce the size of the court, insofar as larger courts are
more likely to give rise to minority majority decisions.121 The problem here is that
several factors—such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem,122 the representative nature of
courts,123 and to some degree collegiality124—argue against major reductions in court
size.
119

Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 685, 723 (2001).
120
Whether this was Congress’s intent is open to debate. The esteemed Supreme Court historian
Charles Warren has suggested that Congress’s action in setting the Court size at nine but the quorum
requirement at six—in excess of the common law standard—was inadvertent: “It would seem that the
provision for six was simply copied from the act of 1863—when the court was to consist of ten—without
any consideration of the fact that while six was a majority of ten it was more than a majority of nine.”
Charles Warren, Letter to the Editor, Quorum of Court: Number Needed Has Changed Not Infrequently,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1942, at E9. But cf. H. E. Cunningham, Note, The Problem of the Supreme Court
Quorum, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 180-81 (1943) (“[I]t may be inferred that Congress . . . determined
to increase the quorum to the end that all questions . . . would receive the attention of at least two-thirds of
the Court . . . . However, there is room for differing judgments on this interpretation of the intent of the . . .
Congress.”).
121
See supra tbl. 3 & n.101.
122
See supra 66-70 and accompanying text.
123
See supra 102-104 and accompanying text.
124
See supra p. 30. Judge Edwards, however, has argued that too many judges can frustrate efforts to
foster collegiality. See Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality, supra note 30, at 1674-75; see also supra note
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One also might introduce action requirements that restrict the ability of the Court
to proceed, even if a quorum is present, if a more robust majority cannot be found. For
example, the Supreme Court might revive its old prohibition against issuing decisions, at
least in constitutional cases, where at least five Justices do not concur in the result.
The problem with these types of solutions is that vacancies, recusals, and illness
are inevitable. Minority majorities could be eliminated if quorum requirements were set
high enough. The problem is that a relatively small number of absences would paralyze
the court. More generally, one can minimize the possible occurrence of minority
majority decisions only at the expense of rendering the court unable to act in more and
more circumstances. But commentators have observed that the politicization of the
judiciary may lead to more protracted battles between the executive and legislative
branches over judicial appointments,125 which may mean that courts may have to subsist
with vacancies for extended periods of time. Additionally, commentators have noted that
the specter of terrorism raises similar prospects.126 In short, the notion of eliminating, or
even substantially limiting, the possible occurrence of minority majority decisions seems
unwise.127
A final consideration applies to courts that maintain discretionary dockets: Should
the action requirement by which cases are selected for appeal change when less than the
full complement of judges is available? To put the point in terms applicable to the United
States Supreme Court, should the “rule of four” by which certiorari is granted128 be
reduced when two Justices are recused?129 On the one hand, allowing fewer Justices’
112 (noting Judge Coffin’s observation that en banc courts “resemble a small legislature more than a
court”).
125
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
126
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; Moss & Siskel, supra note 22, at 1039-41 (calling
upon Congress to enact a statute reducing the Supreme Court’s quorum requirement under particular
circumstances).
127
One might try to ameliorate the problem of minority majorities by having a procedure that authorized
judges from other courts to sit on the court in such cases. Some states use such a procedure to avoid the
problem of an evenly divided court. See supra note 86. (A constitutional amendment would presumably
be required to effect such a change at the level of the United States Supreme Court.)
Unlike tie votes, however, a court with depleted numbers may persist over time. The use of “stand-in”
judges may render judicial decisionmaking less predictable. This is especially problematic for high courts
that often decide matters of first impression, and are free not to follow of lower court precedent. Indeed,
the use of stand-in judges might create additional incentives for those with the power to appoint judges to
employ delaying tactics.
One also might try to limit the length of time that lower courts’ minority majority decisions persist by
having the high court consider whether the lower court decision was a minority majority decision in
deciding whether to grant review. Thus, for example, the United States Supreme Court could announce
that the fact that a lower court decision was issued by a minority majority would weigh favorably toward a
grant of certiorari review. Cf. Nash, supra note 57, at 157-58 (arguing that Supreme Court should be more
willing to grant review of lower court decisions that give rise to a doctrinal paradox). In some sense, the
fact that the Supreme Court has proven more likely to review panel decisions by federal courts of appeals
rather than en banc decisions, see supra note 116, is consistent with this notion.
128
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
129
For a discussion of existing law on this point, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. For
normative analysis, see infra the text accompanying notes 160-166.
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votes to approve a grant of certiorari review may act as a prosthetic guard against the
possibility of minority majority decisions being handed down: The fewer the cases a
seven-Justice Court can hear, the fewer the number of cases in which a minority majority
decision might occur.
On the other hand, such a rule would be overbroad. It might also bar cases from
consideration by a seven-Justice Court that would not have been decided by four-Justice
majorities—i.e., cases with five-, six-, and unanimous seven-Justice majorities. More
problematically, it might keep the Court from deciding pressing issues. In general, the
choice of gatekeeper rule will have an effect upon the collection of cases, and legal
issues, that the Court will hear.130
In the end, then, it seems that some minority majority decisions (or at least the
possibility of some such decisions) are inevitable. The level at which one chooses to set
the quorum requirement, and applicable action requirements, determines how many
minority majority decisions one is ready to tolerate.
Accepting the inevitability of minority majority decisions, a second possible tack
is to focus on the precedential effect of those decisions. As I noted above, the pernicious
effects of minority majority decisions are amplified most greatly by their value as
precedent.131 The effects may be limited, then, by limiting the precedential weight that
such decisions are accorded.
Consider various precedential schemes that courts and commentators have
variously recommended or employed with respect to minority majority decisions. First,
one might say that the “normal” rules of stare decisis132 apply to minority majority
decisions.133
130

See infra the text accompanying notes 161-166.
See supra p. 30.
132
As I discuss below, “normal” weight means simply that a minority majority decision is afforded the
same weight as a like case that is not decided by a minority majority. See infra note 147 and accompanying
text.
133
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mason, 322 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. 1974) (“Whatever the effects of an
opinion supported by less than a majority of those justices participating may be, there can be no doubt that
when a majority of those justices participating join in the opinion, it becomes binding precedent on the
courts of Pennsylvania.”); cf. Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 712 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(With ten active judges on court, “[t]he vote of five members for, four against, and one member
disqualified, and hence not voting, which had previously taken place, constituted a determination by a
majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service ordering rehearing en banc.”); See United
States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 920 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that majority of two votes, not three, was
necessary for en banc review where Congress had authorized four seats on court, but there were only three
judges in active service).
Professor Cappalli questions whether the court in Mason in fact held that decisions of a majority that
falls below a majority of seats on the court are binding on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or simply on
lower courts. He thus questions whether the court in Mason held as it did “because it thought [earlier
precedent of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] was correctly decided and not because of any binding force
of the precedent.” Richard B. Cappalli, What is Authority? Creation and Use of Case Law by
Pennsylvania’s Appellate Courts, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 303, 343 (1999). This seems unlikely given both
(i) the Mason court’s reference to precedent being binding on “the courts of Pennsylvania” (despite a
131
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Second, one might accord minority majority decisions no stare decisis value.
Such decisions would then be binding simply upon the actual litigants, and upon the
courts directly below on remand (like a tie vote).134 Some lower courts have interpreted
the binding effect of Supreme Court minority majority decisions this way,135 and at least
one commentator assumes this to be the case.136
Third, one might view minority majority decisions as fully binding upon lower
courts, but not upon the court that issued the opinion.137

subsequent reference to a particular case being binding “on the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County
and on the Supreme Court,” 322 A.2d at 358), and (ii) the absence of any real examination or endorsement
of the reasoning in the earlier case. Moreover, Chief Justice Jones’ concurring and dissenting opinion
specifically advances the argument, indicating that the majority in Mason rejected that approach. See id. at
359 (Jones, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (“I agree with the majority that our [earlier] decision . . . was
binding on the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County and that it was binding on the Supreme Court.
The decision, however, is not binding upon this Court.”).
134
See, e.g., Whiting v. Town of West Point, 14 S.E. 698, 700 (Va. 1892) (holding that a decision of a
five-justices supreme court rendered by a quorum of three and in which only two justices joined “is not ‘a
precedent’ under the rule of stare decisis”).
135
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in
Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972), not to follow Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), a case that the United States Supreme Court had recently decided by the count of four-to-three).
136
Professor Frickey evidently believes this to be the case. In elucidating issues confronted by the
Supreme Court in the case of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)—a follow-up
on the then-recent affirmative action decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978)—he explains:
The voting setting in Weber was further complicated by the fact that two Justices—Powell,
the swing Justice in Bakke, and Stevens, one of the members of the group voting to strike down
the admissions plan in Bakke because it violated the norm of color blindness—did not participate
in the Weber case. . . . The seven Justices left to decide the Weber case constituted a quorum of
the Supreme Court, but any opinion joined by fewer than five of them would not constitute a
majority opinion subject to the full authority of stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent. Of these
seven remaining Justices, four were the four pro-affirmative action Justices in Bakke, and the
other three had all voted to invalidate the admissions plan in Bakke as inconsistent with Title VI.
The most likely result, one would have predicted, was a largely Pyrrhic, four-to-three victory for
Kaiser and the Steelworkers, denying Weber’s challenge, but leaving for another day and case
the ultimate resolution of the controversy concerning the applicability of Title VII to racial
quotas in private employment.
Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1175-76 (2000) (footnote omitted).
(Ultimately, these concerns did not come to pass, as the Court resolved the case by a vote of five-to-two.
See id. at 1176-77.)
137
This was the view taken by the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Mason, 322
A.2d at 359 (Jones, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (asserting that, while an earlier decision that was
endorsed by a minority majority is binding on lower courts, “[t]he decision . . . is not binding upon this
Court”), if not the majority of the court, see supra note 133.
The Michigan Supreme Court also has concluded that “a decision rendered by less than four justices
who nevertheless constitute a majority of a legally constituted quorum is binding on the Court of Appeals
and the trial courts.” Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W.2d 98, 98 (Mich. 1976). The court in Negri explicitly
declined to address the question of whether such a decision also binds in any way the Michigan Supreme
Court. See id. at 100 (“We limit our decision to the question before us, namely are lower courts bound by
majority decisions of this Court of less than four justices.”).
36

Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and the Mischief of Quorum Requirements

Fourth, one might see minority majority decisions as of some, moderately
diminished precedential value.138 For example, a court might decide that minority
majority decisions might be more readily overruled than another case decided by a full
majority, all other things being equal. Or, a high court might decide that established
precedent may not be overruled by a minority majority decision.139 Finally, courts might
ascribe different precedential weight according to the reason for the reduction in court
complement: The fact that two Justices recused themselves may mean that the issue in
question readily might arise again so that little harm likely would result from delaying
definitive resolution of the issue, while the persistence of vacancies on the Court might
make it more important for minority majority decisions to have binding effect.
C. The Normative Question: What to do about Minority Majority Cases
In this Section, I consider the normative question of what do about minority
majority decisions. In doing so, I evaluate strategies of the two types discussed in the
previous Section. I argue that steps should be taken both to limit the occurrence of
minority majority cases, and also—to the extent that their occurrence is to some degree
inevitable—to limit their precedential reach.
Consider first the question of limiting the occurrence of cases decided by minority
majorities. As discussed above, the larger the size of the court, the more likely it is that a
bare majority quorum rule will result in minority decisions.140 Especially for larger
courts, then, it is desirable to have quorum requirement in excess of bare majority of
court size. It may also make sense to require some diversity of representation to the
extent that the court is designed to consist of members from distinct geographic
regions.141
Another desirable strategy would be to impose an action requirement that
precludes the issuance of opinions absent the concurrence of a majority of judges
authorized to sit on the court.142 It should be noted, however, that this strategy might
delay—beyond the imposition of the quorum requirement—a court in addressing
important legal issues.
I turn now to evaluate the various possible precedential rules from a normative
perspective. To do so, it is important to have in place a normative framework. First,
138

See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in the Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869)).
139
Consider Justice Stevens’ reasoning in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 568 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring), discussed at supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also Cappalli, supra note 133, at
343-48 (footnote omitted) (describing a sequence of cases at the end of which “three of five justices [on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court] overruled a five-year old precedent that was decided by a full court without
dissent,” but defending the three-judge majority’s action on the ground that “the two relevant [supreme
court] precedents . . . badly conflicted in rationale”).
140
See supra tbl. 3 and accompanying text.
141
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
142
For example, this would call for the Supreme Court to revive its old practice of not issuing decisions
in constitutional cases absent the concurrence of a majority of judges authorized to sit on the Court.
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adherence to precedent enhances the legitimacy of the court in question.143 As such,
consistency of a precedential rule for minority majority decisions is normatively
desirable. Second, ensconcing erroneous rules is normatively undesirable.144 Relatedly,
even if erroneous rules are not entirely ensconced such that “correct” rules will ultimately
be reached, it is undesirable to have to expend more judicial resources to get to those
“correct” results. All this weighs in favor of less binding precedential rules, especially
where the “correctness” of a ruling is uncertain. Finally, finality is a virtue: It fosters
reliability and predictability.145 Thus, delay in definitely resolving questions of law is
normatively undesirable. This is especially the case for high courts, whose job it is to
clarify legal confusion; indeed, such courts often select cases precisely for this purpose.
Insofar as nonbinding decisions do not definitively resolve legal questions, this
consideration weighs in favor of more binding precedential rules.
I evaluate precedential rules for minority majority cases along two axes:
precedential weight for the court that issued the decision, and precedential weight for
lower courts. I begin with precedential weight of a court on that court’s own future
holdings, i.e., so-called horizontal stare decisis. I consider five possible rules:
Rule I-A: Full precedential weight: the same precedential weight as accorded a
like case not decided by a minority majority.
Rule I-B: Limited precedential weight: Precedential weight, but more easily
overruled than a like case not decided by a minority majority.
Rule I-C: Narrow precedential weight: Precedential weight, but to be interpreted
more narrowly than a case not decided by a minority majority.
Rule I-D: Limited and narrow precedential weight: Precedential weight, but
(i) more easily overruled than a like case not decided by a minority
majority, and (ii) to be interpreted more narrowly than a case not decided
by a minority majority.
143

See, e.g., Nash & Pardo, supra note 73, at ___.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (noting the “problematic situation of an initial court decision that turns out to be illadvised yet binding on all other courts”); Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a
Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1422 (2005) (“The existence of parallel, non-intersecting
lines of authority means that a blockage or error in one will not affect the other.”).
145
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (“[W]hen this Court
reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of
law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we
may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability, . . . ; whether
the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, . . . ; whether related principles of law have so far developed as
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, . . . ; or whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification . . . .” (citations omitted)). For critique of the Court’s reliance upon the supposed
“nonworkability” of prior precedent to overrule that precedent, see Lauren Vicki Stark, Note, The
Unworkable Unworkability Test, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665 (2005).
144
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Rule I-E: No precedential weight.
In keeping with the normative framework I set out above,146 I measure the rules
against three potential problems: (a) the extent to which the rule raises questions about
the legitimacy of the court system; and (b) the possibility that the rule will give rise to
error costs and the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources; and (c) the extent to
which the rule will likely delay the high court in resolving definitively questions of law.
Table 4 summarizes the results.
Table 4: Normative analysis of possible horizontal stare decisis rules for minority majority cases.

I-A
I-B
I-C
I-D
I-E

Rule:
Stare Decisis
Effect?

Interpretations?

Legitimacy

Problem:
Delay

Full
Full
Limited
Limited
None

Broad
Narrow
Broad
Narrow
--

No problem.
Marginal problem.
Marginal problem.
Marginal problem.
Moderate problem.

No problem.
Marginal problem.
Marginal problem.
Marginal problem.
Fair problem.

Error
costs/wasted
resources
Problem.
Moderate problem.
Moderate problem.
Mild problem.
Mild problem.

Consider first Rule I-A—“full precedential weight”—under which a minority
majority decision is accorded the same weight as a like case that is not decided by a
minority majority.147 Rule I-A is not at all problematic in terms of a court’s legitimacy in
issuing decisions that are not entitled to precedential weight. Nor is there a problem in
terms of any delay in announcing definitive answers to important legal questions.
There is, however, a potential problem with respect to Rule I-A’s refusal to allow
minority majority decisions, all other things being equal, to be more easily overruled.
Minority majority decisions will be ensconced, with the problem being that a minority of
the full court can substantially bind later decisions of the court.
There is also a potential problem with respect to Rule I-A’s assumption that
minority majority decisions will be interpreted by subsequent courts as broadly as
decisions handed down by standard majorities. As noted above, minority majority
decisions may tend to be broader than decisions issued by a standard majority (or
majorities in excess thereof).148 Professor Sunstein has argued that there is virtue in
deciding cases modestly, without reaching out to decide more than the cases themselves
demand.149 But that goal will be frustrated if broader minority majority decisions are
146

See supra the text accompanying notes 143-145.
The moniker “full precedential weight” thus does not mean that the case can never be overruled. It
simply may be overruled as readily as (and no more easily than) a like case that was not decided by a
minority majority.
148
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
149
See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-21 (1996)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Foreword]; id. at 30-33 (discussing the circumstances under which judicial
minimalism and maximalism are appropriate); Cass Sunstein, The Minimalist, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2006,
at ___ (“[N]arrow rulings help to promote a key goal of societies that are both diverse and free: to make
agreement possible where agreement is necessary, while also making agreement unnecessary where
agreement is not possible.”); see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Professor Sunstein has also explained the value of judicial minimalism in
147
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afforded full precedential weight.150 And the problem will be further exacerbated if those
decisions are no more easily overruled than any other decisions.
Rule I-B addresses the first of these concerns by directing that minority majority
decisions be given limited precedential weight. Under this rule, for example, a Supreme
Court decision handed down by a majority of four Justices would be more easily
overruled than the same decision handed down by a greater majority. In other words, it
would be more susceptible to being overruled simply by virtue of the fact that it garnered
a majority of merely four votes. The rule would also somewhat mitigate the problem of
broad minority majority decisions holding sway by rendering minority majority decisions
easier to overrule.
Such a rule might be seen somewhat to impinge upon the courts’ legitimacy—
insofar as courts would be seen to be issuing decisions without full precedential weight
(although as I discuss above, courts do that even now151)—but at most only in a minor
way. Moreover, courts even now issue decisions that do not enjoy full precedential
weight. At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court has at times indicated that cases that
are decided by closer margins are more susceptible to being overruled than are cases
decided by wider margins.152 If having a case decided by a narrower margin constitutes a
terms of options for the future, where the merits of minimalism turn upon the value of the option
purchased:
Narrow judicial rulings, of the sort celebrated by judicial minimalists, can be understood as a way
of buying an option, or at least “paying” a certain amount in return for flexibility. Judges who leave
things undecided and who focus their rulings on the facts of particular cases are in a sense forcing
themselves, and society as a whole, to purchase an option in return for flexibility in the resolution
of subsequent problems. Whether that option is worthwhile depends on its price and the benefits
that it provides.
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 858 (2006) (footnote omitted).
For a critique of Justice O’Connor’s judicial minimalistic approach, see Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2006).
150
See Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 149, at 25-28 (discussing the connection between stare decisis
and minimalist jurisprudence).
151
See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also infra the text accompanying notes 152, and 154156.
152
See, e.g., Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 829 (1991) (justifying the overruling of earlier Supreme
Court decisions in part on the ground that they were decided by “the narrowest of margins, over spirited
dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions”); cf Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing
Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L.
618, 639 (2006) (noting that a 5-4 U.S. Supreme Court decision is “a binding opinion without seeming
authoritarian,” and discussing an example of the Court overruling an earlier controversial decision decided
by 5-4 vote) ; but see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision Making and
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 113 (1991) (“It would disrupt our legal system severely for anyone on
or off the Court to treat a 5-4 vote with a vigorous dissent as a rule of law entitled to less respect from the
Court and other government decisionmakers than any of the Court's other constitutional law decisions.”).
The High Court of Australia seems to afford full weight to narrowly decided decisions. If ever there
were a case that the Court would have had a strong incentive to overrule on that ground, it would seem to
be Commonwealth v. Tasmania, more commonly known as the Tasmanian Dam case, 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983),
a 4-3 decision that generated considerable political and social controversy. See generally Leslie Zines, The
Tasmanian Dam Case, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 262 (H.P. LEE & GEORGE
WINTERTON eds., 2003). In spite of the “political and social pressures and passions that resulted from it,”
the case has “stood up well over the years.” Id. at 278. (I am grateful to Keith Kendall for this reference.)
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“strike” against the case’s stare decisis weight—and presumably is deemed not to
infringe substantially upon the Court’s legitimacy—then it would seem no more of a
problem to deem it a “strike” against a case that it was decided by a minority majority.153
A rule of limited precedential weight also would delay the court’s ability to
address some pressing legal issues. Again, however, this effect would be limited and be
felt only at the margins.
Rule I-C addresses the second concern with Rule I-A—that broad minority
majority decisions would be broadly controlling—by calling for narrow precedential
effect for minority majority decisions. To the extent that the rule rendered the perception
of courts as less legitimate, or delayed the courts in addressing pressing legal issues, such
effects would be at worst minor.
Rule I-D—limited and narrow precedential weight for minority majority
decisions—combines Rules I-B and I-C, and thus addresses both concerns raised by Rule
I-A. It also would introduce the negative effects, minor though they may be, of both the
rules that constitute it.
Last, Rule I-E would direct that minority majority decisions be given no
precedential weight. Such a rule clearly would introduce a potential delay in courts
addressing pressing legal matters. Another issue is whether the legitimacy of the court
would be impugned by the practice of issuing decisions that would not have full stare
decisis effect. One need only point to the widespread practice among federal courts of
appeals to issue so-called unpublished opinions that are explicitly denied precedential
effect.154 While this practice has generated considerable academic debate and some have
argued that the practice does indeed tend to undermine the courts’ legitimacy,155 the
practice has elicited little public hue and cry, perhaps though because the practice is not
widely understood among the public. It may be that such a practice would be more
problematic for a judicial system’s high court, which is designed not (like the federal
courts of appeals) to decide all cases appealed to it, but rather to definitively resolve
issues of particular importance. Another response is that courts—including the Supreme
Court—issue tie decisions that are simply “affirmed by an equally divided court” and
entitled to no precedential weight.156 Why could not courts similarly issue decisions that
153

One might argue that cases decided by 4-2 and especially 4-3 margins are already more susceptible
to being overruled simply by virtue of the narrow margin of their decision. One also might argue, however,
that such cases deserve a second stare decisis “strike.”
154
See generally supra note 90 and accompanying text.
155
See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 90.
156
See supra note 63.
The absence of precedent is even more acute when the court of appeals votes to hear a case en banc and
then produces a tie vote. The grant of en banc review renders the original panel decision devoid of
precedential weight, see supra notes 93, 113, and accompanying text, while the tie en banc vote precludes
affording the en banc court any precedential weight. See, e.g., Henderson v. Fort Worth Independent
School District, 584 F.2d 115, 116 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (“A petition for rehearing En banc was
granted, which effectively vacates the panel opinion as a citable precedent. With the panel opinion vacated,
the En banc court has reached an even division as to the issues raised on appeal. Thus, the district court is
affirmed by operation of law, and the decision of the court of appeals has no precedential value.”); Dasher
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affirm or reverse (or render some other disposition) “by an insufficiently constituted
majority,” that also would not be entitled to precedential effect?157
Reviewing the options, it seems that, unless the concern over delays in courts
addressing pressing legal issues is great, Rule I-D is preferable to Rules I-B and I-C, with
Rule I-A—full precedential weight for minority majority decisions—requiring too much
deference to minority majority decisions. Rule I-E—which would offer minority
majority decisions no precedential weight—would clearly exacerbate delays in issues
being definitively resolved. But for that, however, the rule is fairly attractive and,
perhaps surprisingly, seems workable in light of the existing treatment of tie votes. To be
sure, there is a priori at least little reason to expect there to be substantially more minority
majority decisions than decisions rendered by tie vote. At the least, the notion of
affording minority majority decisions no precedential weight is underexplored.
Beyond this, note that it might be possible to vary the choice of rule according to
the circumstances under which the court vacancies arise. For example, one could
imagine the Court announcing that it would follow Rule I-E in a case where vacancies
were entirely or largely the result of recusals and the issue raised were likely to recur—
meaning that the Court would soon again have a chance to resolve the issue definitively
such that delay costs would be low—but Rule I-D in cases where vacancies are seen as
likely to persist and/or the issue less likely to arise again soon.
I turn now to the treatment of minority majority court precedent issued by lower
courts, i.e., the question of vertical stare decisis. Consider these five possible rules:
Rule II-A: Full precedential weight: the same precedential weight as accorded a
like case not decided by a minority majority.
Rule II-B: Limited precedential weight: Precedential weight, but more justifiably
not followed than a like case not decided by a minority majority.
Rule II-C: Narrow precedential weight: Precedential weight, but to be interpreted
more narrowly than a case not decided by a minority majority.
Rule II-D: Limited and narrow precedential weight: Precedential weight, but
(i) more justifiably not followed than a like case not decided by a minority
majority, and (ii) to be interpreted more narrowly than a case not decided
by a minority majority.
Rule II-E: No precedential weight.
v. Stripling, 714 F.2d 1084, 1084 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (“This Court took the case en banc, which
resulted in the panel opinion being vacated. The judges of the en banc court are equally divided on the
proper disposition of this case. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed as a matter of law,
and this decision of the Court of Appeals has no precedential value.”).
157
Cf. Caminker, supra note 98, at 2315 n.51 (outlining the possibility that perhaps judgment impasses
should be treated the same way that equal divisions are treated, by creating a rule of “affirmed by a
deadlocked Court”).
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I assume that it would be inappropriate, and render the judicial system
illegitimate, for the high court to be more tightly bound by a minority majority decision
than lower courts.158 Thus, for example, if the high court follows Rule I-A, I-B, I-C, or ID, then the lower courts could not adopt Rule II-E; Rule II-E is appropriate (though not
necessary) only if the high courts has adopted Rule I-E.
Beyond that constraint, I consider the following factors in evaluating possible
lower court rules: (a) the extent to which the rule raises questions about the legitimacy of
the court system; and (b) the possibility that the rule will give rise to error costs and the
unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.159 Table 5 summarizes the analysis.
Table 5: Normative analysis of possible vertical stare decisis rules for minority majority cases.
Rule:
Problem:
Stare Decisis
Interpretations?
Legitimacy
Error
Effect?
costs/Wasted
resources
Full
Broad
Slight problem
Problem
II-A
Full
Narrow
No problem
Slight problem
II-B
Limited
Broad
Problem
Problem
II-C
Limited
Narrow
Problem
Slight problem
II-D
None
-Large
problem
Problem
II-E

Consider first Rule II-A. While giving full stare decisis effect to decisions of a
high court will not be seen as illegitimate, the notion of giving broad interpretations to
minority majority decisions might be somewhat problematic. Following minority
majority decisions, and especially interpreting them broadly might give rise to substantial
error costs.
Rule II-B improves upon Rule II-A by calling for narrow interpretations of
minority majority decisions. Rule II-B seems more legitimate, and to give rise to fewer
error costs, than does Rule II-A.
Rules II-C and II-D call for only limited stare decisis effect to be given by lower
courts to high court minority majority decisions. The problem here is legitimacy: It may
158

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has explained:
A district judge may not respectfully (or disrespectfully) disagree with his learned colleagues on his
own court of appeals who have ruled on a controlling legal issue, or with Supreme Court Justices
writing for a majority of the Court. Binding authority within this regime cannot be considered and
cast aside; it is not merely evidence of what the law is. Rather, caselaw on point is the law. If a
court must decide an issue governed by a prior opinion that constitutes binding authority, the later
court is bound to reach the same result, even if it considers the rule unwise or incorrect. Binding
authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so.
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted). The court further noted that
“[t]he same practice is followed in the state courts as well.” Id. at 1170 n.24.
159
While delay in issuing decisions could be a major cost for a high court—and thus for the choice
among Rules I-A, I-B, I-C, I-D, and I-E—it is of less import for intermediate appellate courts—and thus for
the choice among Rules II-A, II-B, II-C, II-D, and II-E.
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be seen as illegitimate for lower courts to decline to follow duly issued high court
majority decisions, even if they are issued by minority majorities. Rule II-D improves
slightly upon Rule II-C on the error cost front by calling only for narrow interpretations
of such rulings. Neither rule, however, seems optimal.
Rule II-E is especially problematic. First, the notion that lower courts might be
free not to follow some high court decisions—even those issued by minority majorities—
raises legitimacy concerns. Second, a lack of obligation to follow these decisions at all
might well give rise to substantial error costs. (As above, however, one could imagine a
‘choice of precedential weight’ rule that invoked Rule II-E in a case where high court
vacancies were entirely or largely the result of recusals and the issue raised is seen as
likely to arise again soon.)
At the end of the day, then, Rule II-B seems optimal. However, insofar as (as I
explained above) lower courts ought not to be less bound by high court decisions than is
the high court itself, Rule II-B is only a viable option if the high court does not adopt
Rule I-A (which requires the high court to give full precedential effect and broad
interpretations to high court minority majority decisions). The optimal combination of
rules would seem to be Rule I-D or I-E, and Rule II-B.
The final question of rules relates to the high court’s rule for selecting cases for its
discretionary docket. Assume that, with a full complement, the high court requires the
affirmative vote of x of its judges to grant discretionary review. We may consider two
variations to this rule in the context of a depleted bench:
Rule III-A: Court still requires x votes to grant discretionary review.
Rule III-B: Court requires y votes, where y < x, to grant discretionary review.
For example, then, in the case of the United States Supreme Court, Rule III-A would
retain the “rule of four” even in the face of a depleted bench, while Rule III-B would
reduce the four-vote requirement for at least some depleted benches.160
The problem that the choice of rules in this area addresses is path dependence
with respect to cases that percolate up to the high court.161 If the rule governing grants of

160

The rule might be different, for example, for a nine-person Supreme Court where seven, as opposed
to eight, Justices are sitting.
Somewhat analogous to the question of whether recusals should affect the number of Supreme Court
Justices required to grant a certiorari petition is the question of whether recused circuit judges should be
included in the total number of active circuit judges of whom a majority is required to grant en banc
review. If recused circuit judges are counted yet (by virtue of their recusal) cannot vote, then the voting
rule effectively will count the recused judges as voting against en banc review. See, e.g., Howard J.
Bashman, Recused Federal Appellate Judges Should Not be Counted as Voting against Petitions for
Rehearing En Banc, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 9, 2001. A 2005 amendment to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure resolved the ambiguity—and a circuit split—determining that the majority required is
of “circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are not disqualified.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
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discretionary review remains equally stringent—i.e., the case of Rule III-A—then the
court may grant review in fewer cases. Rule III-A may thus be said to be
underinclusive.162 In contrast, if the rule governing grants of discretionary review is
rendered less stringent—i.e., the case of Rule III-B—then the court may grant review in
more cases. Rule III-B may thus be said to be overinclusive.163 This is summarized in
Table 6.
Table 6: Normative analysis of action requirement to grant discretionary review for depleted courts.
Rule:
Effect on court’s docket as compared to fullystaffed court:
III-A: Maintain same action requirement.
Underinclusive.
III-B: Reduce action requirement.
Overinclusive.

Note that the extent of the problem of path dependence turns upon the choice of
rules governing the precedential weight of minority majority decisions both for the high
court itself and lower courts. The more binding minority majority decisions are, the more
problematic it is for additional cases to be heard by the court and potentially decided by
minority majorities.164 Insofar as the choices of Rules I-D or I-E, and Rule II-B, are
designed to mitigate some of the effects of broad precedential weight,
overinclusiveness—that is, Rule III-B—becomes less of a problem.165
At the same time, there is another option that may be even more satisfactory, by
adding in an additional hurdle, even while reducing the number of votes required to grant
discretionary review on a reduced bench. For example, one can conceive of a regime
under which discretionary review is granted with fewer votes than would be required
were the full bench available, provided that the relevant state or federal solicitor general
joins the request for discretionary review.166

161

See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984) (describing content of Supreme Court
docket, and critiquing the method by which the Court’s docket was then determined).
162
See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 62, at 687 (“If a submajority rule such as the Rule of Four
produces too few grants of certiorari, a Rule of Three might be adopted instead.”).
163
It is unlikely to be the same because of both (1) chance as to the number of absences in any given
case, and (2) the fact that it is nearly impossible to get the same ratio for most existing court sizes.
164
It might also serve as an invitation for greater strategic voting on certiorari petitions. Cf. Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari Jurisprudential Considerations in
Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389 (2004) (arguing that Justices’ jurisprudential
considerations in considering certiorari petitions differ from their concerns in resolving cases on the
merits). For a normative evaluation of strategic voting on the part of judges, see generally Caminker, supra
note 98.
165
See Lubet, supra note 17, at 670 (“The current rigid insistence on four votes . . . seems to be more a
response to the pressures of an increasing caseload rather than the product of principle.”).
166
Cf. Mitchel de S. –O. –l’E. Lasser, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 47 (2004) (discussing, under the French civil justice system,
the role of the “magistrat” known as the “Advocate Generally,” and that “[s]tructurally, . . . the Advocate
General occupies a privileged, intermediate position between the parties and the court”).
One might argue that the views of the Solicitor General are already taken into account by Justices in
their votes on certiorari petitions. One also might argue that such a rule would give rise to separation of
powers concerns if it were implemented by Congress. See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
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D. Institutional Choice
A final question in setting forth the possible treatment—and the desirable
treatment—of minority majority decisions is that of institutional choice. Which branch,
or branches, of government can decide on the proper treatment? I consider that question
in this Section.
One might at first blush think that decisions as to stare decisis effect fall solely
within the province of the courts.167 However, as several commentators have observed,
the legislature’s unquestioned authority to set quorum requirements makes clear that it
has some authority in the area.168 Indeed perhaps even greater latent authority rests with
the legislature.169
One could take the argument further and argue that, by setting the quorum
requirement, the legislature establishes an “on/off switch” for precedent, below which the
courts simply cannot decline to give precedential effect. Such an argument, however, is
belied by the Supreme Court’s old action requirement of having a majority of judges
authorized to sit on the Court concur in an opinion on a constitutional matter before the
167

See, e.g., McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“recogniz[ing]
that a three-judge panel has the statutory and constitutional power to overrule the decision of another threejudge panel,” although concluding that, “as a matter of prudence, a three-judge panel of this court should
not exercise that power”); Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 712 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(Murnaghan, J.) (noting “suggestion” in Supreme Court jurisprudence” that circuit court might be allowed
“by rule to select, as a quorum for purposes of ascertaining a majority, when votes on suggestions for
hearings or rehearings en banc are taken, either (a) all judges in regular active service, including those
disqualified for the purposes of the particular case or (b) all judges otherwise in regular active service who
are not, for the purposes of the particular case, disqualified from participating in any way”). Cf. Hart v.
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The judicial power clause, by contrast, has never
before been thought to encompass a constitutional limitation on how courts conduct their business,”
including “one aspect of the way federal courts do business—the way they issue opinions . . . .”).
168
For the proposition that congressional power to control the quorum implies authority to set rules of
stare decisis, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503,
540 n.110 (2000) (“While a rule of precedent inevitably has some effects on doctrine, causing some cases
to come out as they otherwise would not, such effects cannot mean that Congress lacks the power to adopt
such a rule. The quorum rule for the Supreme Court . . . also can have that effect.”); cf. Hartnett, supra
note 49, at 646 n.17 (“The quorum statute is a neglected example of the breadth of congressional power to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the judicial power.”).
169
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000); John Harrison, The Power of Congress
over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2001). See also Am.
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (endorsing the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), in part on the ground that the Second
Circuit definitively decided the case under congressional statute in the absence of a quorum on the Supreme
Court and those circumstances “add to its weight as precedent”); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (directing that
federal courts not grant relief to state habeas petitioners “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.”); Bonner v. City of Pritchard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (recognizing that, though it did not do so, Congress had the power to set the rules of
precedent for the new Eleventh Circuit when that circuit was created by dividing the old Fifth Circuit) .
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opinion could issue; if the Court can decline to act at all even if the legislative quorum
requirement is met, then surely the Court can act but decline to give its decision full, or
any, precedential effect. In the end, the answer seems to be that the judiciary and
legislature share authority to determine stare decisis rules in this regard.
A similar answer seems to obtain for the related question of the rules governing
discretionary review for high courts. Justice Stevens has argued, in an academic setting,
that the “rule of four” is an instance of federal common law.170 Presumably, then, the
Court could alter the rule of its own accord. At the same time, the Court enjoys
discretionary control over its docket in part because of promises made by the Justices to
Congress regarding the use of the “rule of four.”171 Moreover, if the “rule of four” is
federal common law, then Congress could alter it even if the Court chose not to. Once
again, the answer seems to be an amalgam of power in this area.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this Paper, I have argued for closer examination of minority majority judicial
decisions. Minority majority decisions raise concerns about the legitimacy of the court
system. The problem is exacerbated when such decisions are accorded precedential
weight.
I have identified two broad strategies for containing the problem of minority
majority decisions. One strategy involves court structure, and calls for either increasing
quorum requirements or decreasing court size. The problem with this type of strategy is
that it constrains freedom in designing the judiciary by taking desirable quorum and court
size options off the table. These concerns are heightened in times at which there is
perceived to be an increased threat to the polity and its institutions.
The second broad strategy involves choices about the precedential effect of
minority majority decisions. Here, I have argued that an attractive option is for courts to
afford limited and narrow interpretations to prior precedents issued by minority
majorities. I have also argued that the option of affording such decisions no precedential
weight is undervalued and underexplored. It seems that concerns of legitimacy have been
relied upon to dismiss this notion, but the power of this argument is overstated: If it is so
vital that every opinion have precedential weight, then one must question the current
practice of issuing opinions that, because of a tie vote, lack precedential effect, and also
the current practice of issuing non-binding, unpublished opinions.
For lower courts seeking to determine how much weight to give minority majority
opinions issued by higher courts, I have argued that at the least those opinions should be
given at least as much weight as the higher court itself would give such opinions. More
generally, I have suggested that affording them narrow, limited precedential effect is an
attractive option.

170
171

See Stevens, supra note 49.
See generally Hartnett, supra note 49.
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Last, I argue that perhaps the rule used by high courts to select cases for their
discretionary dockets should be relaxed where judges are recused or otherwise absent.
To the extent that too few judges might then decide upon the composition of the court’s
docket, the views of the representative of the executive branch might be given some
weight.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Jonathan R. Nash
jnash4@emory.edu
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